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Chapter I
A. Overview

Introduction

To effectively enforce a given right, the right holder needs to focus on two factors:
the first factor concerns ex ante precaution, which means making prohibitive rules
that aim at any kind of violations. The second one, more importantly, concerns
efficient ex post remedies which compensate the losses of right holders as a result of
infringements. In the context of copyright, such framework remains the same.
Copyright damages, inter alia, function as a highly important role in copyright law for
enforcement. For one, copyright damages can give prevailing party actual
benefits---monetary compensation. Such benefits can preserve sufficient incentives
for right holders to continue creation of new works. For another, significant amount of
damages no doubt deprive infringers of unjust enrichment and deter future violation. 1
Under the circumstances, copyright damages primarily design for the protection of
copyright and maintaining the progress of culture. However, unexpected situation
appears when copyright steps into digital age. The scenario below will illustrate the
case.
Imagine a popular singer recently publishes several CDs that contain dozens of
new songs. He of course wishes to recoup the profits from these songs to the utmost
after marketing. Everything goes well until one day he notices that one peer-to-peer
platform--“Free Listening”--uploads his songs without authorization and allows
online users to download for free. Such action irritates the singer and he accordingly
1

See H.R. No. 94-1476, ¶ 3 “Damages are awarded to compensate the copyright owner for losses from

the infringement and profits are awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly benefiting from a
wrongful act.”

1

decides to file lawsuit. The purpose of the filing is self-evident: imposing penalty on
infringers who violate the exclusive rights and obtaining compensation. Obviously,
the most proper remedy under current copyright law is the damages.
Nevertheless, facing online copyright infringement needs to consider several
issues if one decide to rely on such remedy to enforce exclusive rights: Who should
be the major targets for imposing damages? The P2P platform may be the target, but it
does not directly earn profits through infringement; Individual end-users, on the other
hand, primarily seek for non-commercial enjoyment even if they directly infringe
copyrighted songs. Both groups do not obtain commercial profits by infringement. So,
these situations add difficulty for proving the illegal profits. Then what about the
actual damages? One can claim the lost sales of CD because of the P2P file-sharing
platform, but speculations still exist: does the dissemination really account for all the
lost sales? What if other market elements affect the sales?
Even if one can simply choose statutory damages regardless any proof, the final
awarding may still be problematic. First of all, each song can be counted as single
work for statutory damages when separately uploaded. So, the final awarding would
be astronomical even if courts grant the lower end--$750 per infringed work. 2
Compared with retail price of each CD, such awarding is unjust and departs from
compensating purpose. The situation becomes even worse when targeting on
individual end-users. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset is the very case in point.
A single, household mother had to pay $220,000 --$9,250 per infringed song--to the

2

17 U.S.C. § 504 (b).

2

copyright holder as statutory damages. 3
To cure these problems, a quick answer is awarding copyright damages under the
correct understanding of property rules, and limiting excessive statutory damages.
This answer can better achieve purpose of sufficient compensation and effective
deterrence. In general, the aforementioned problematic situations are largely due to
the impact by digital technologies as well as online environment.
Tracing back of copyright history, new emerging technologies always challenge
the perceptions of copyright and arises new problems. Digital technologies bring
about speedy and widespread distribution, easy and costless copying, high volume of
compression and global accessibility, etc. These advanced features by digital
technologies gradually change both the perceptions of copyright and the balance
between disparate groups. Each group wants to maximize their interests by exploiting
these technologies.
Historically, copyright holders never remain silence when new technologies
facilitate infringement and intimidate their business models as well as profit channels.
When it comes to digital technologies, right holders react the same. Over the past
years, the Recording Industry of Association America (RIAA) struggled to combat
against online copyright piracy through digital technologies. 4 The RIAA found the
advanced technologies greatly threaten their high-profits industry. Hence, the RIAA

3

579 F.Supp.2d 1210, at 1227 (D. Minn.2008).

4

Will Moseley, A New (Old) Solution For Online Copyright Enforcement After Thomas and

Tenenbaum, 25 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 311 2010 (stating that RIAA file suits separately against
individual end-users who illegal download and distribute musical files and OSP that facilitate
unauthorized music sharing).

3

filed large amount of lawsuits against individual end-users who downloaded,
distributed unauthorized music online as well as Online Service Providers (OSPs).
They won in several cases such as A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 5 and MGM
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 6, forced them to shut down or go bankruptcy. The war of
litigation to individual end-users, however, proved to be ineffective, costly and even
harmful to RIAA’s commercial image. At the end of 2008, RIAA announced to cease
the seven-year long litigation against individual end-users as a result of the
ineffectiveness of statutory damages to online copyright infringement. 7
Current copyright damages contain two segments. Damages upon actual damages
or/and illegal profits; statutory damages. To award damages upon actual damages, the
plaintiff needs to prove decreasing sales caused by infringements. Such proof,
however, usually tends to be unreliable because of the distinctive features on digital
works. As to illegal profits, the problem becomes more complicated because OSPs
and P2P platforms rarely gain profits by direct infringements. On the other hand,
statutory damages sometimes cause unjust, inconsistent and excessive awarding. 8
Such results do not squarely fits into the requirement of optimal compensation and
effective deterrence; ultimately cause chilling effect on technology innovation and
culture progress. In addition to practical problems, the rationality of copyright
damages is questionable. After all, current framework is designed for copyright
5

239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

6

545 U.S. 913 (2005).

7

See Moseley, supra note 4, at 311-312.

8

Anna Cronk, The punishment Doesn’t fit the Crime—Why and How Congress Should Revise the

Statutory Copyright Damages Provision for Noncommercial Infringements on Peer-to-Peer
File-Sharing Networks, 39 SW. L. REV. 181 (2009-2010).

4

infringements occurred in pre-digital age. Therefore, copyright damages indeed need
further consideration and reassessment.
Traditionally, copyright share the features of property. Specifically, copyright
holders enjoy highly exclusive rights to exclude others from exploiting their works. In
theory, injunction is the representative of property rules. Damages, on the other hand,
operate under liability rules because damages primarily design for sufficient
compensation. Copyright damages, to the contrary, not only compensate the right
holders, but impose additional punishment so as to deprive unjust enrichment. Under
the circumstances, the infringers have to resume free-market transaction because of
their unprofitable condition. This is similar to the concept of property rules: one who
wants to remove an entitlement cannot simply pay the price after the removal. 9 He
should negotiate with the owner and reach agreement for the transaction. 10 Therefore,
the effect of copyright damages comes closely to property rules.
Stepping into digital age, the conclusion remains the same. Each copyright holder
regards their online works as personal property and seeks to effectively enforce their
copyright online. They frequently depend on damages for enforcement when
infringements occur, yet the high frequency eventually lead to unreasonable results.
The reason lies in the misunderstanding of property rules and the application of such
misunderstanding to copyright damages. Never a property owner can internalize all
positive externalities. So, copyright holders should not rely on damages to internalize

9

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One

View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1092 (1971-1972).
10

Id.

5

all positive externalities from their online works so long as they are sufficiently
compensated. Theoretically, copyright law is enacted to “promote the progress of
science and useful arts”. 11 Hence, permitting some free riding online will better
achieve the purpose because most copyright creations rely on preexisting works.
Whether copyright damages are efficient lies in how the final awarding affects
disparate groups. On one hand, copyright holders need sufficient compensation to
preserve incentive for further creation. Lacks of such incentive, no one are willing to
continue creation because free riding frustrate their motivation. Under the
circumstances, the society will have a gradual narrower public domain and less
available resources. On the other hand, copyright damages should deter infringement
by make infringers unprofitable. As a result, infringers will choose to obtain license
from copyright holders rather than commit infringement. Therefore, copyright
damages should both achieve two requirements: sufficient compensation and effective
deterrence.
B. Methodology and Research Scope
The method of this thesis is generally literature research. Judicial cases, statutes
and legal articles will be used. In addition to the above materials, the thesis also
covers some results of surveys with respect to RIAA lawsuits against individual
end-users. The reaction by individual end-users will illustrate this problematic strategy.
This thesis generally describes online technologies and analyzes the framework of
infringement in the context of technology background. The core section of thesis is

11

U.S. CONST. art.I, §8, cl.8.

6

the analysis of copyright damages in online environment with relevant problems and
the accordingly suggestions. Moreover, since copyright damages strongly correlates to
property rules, the thesis also looks into the relation between copyright damages and
property rules, trying to clarify a correct guidance for effective damages to online
infringement.
C. Framework of Thesis
Chapter II of this thesis contains two sections. The first section focuses on three
major features of advanced digital technologies—easy reproduction, speedy
distribution and high volume compression. The description denotes how these
technologies change the traditional perceptions of copyright. The second section
discusses the framework of online copyright infringement in the context of digital
technologies. To facilitate the analysis, this section divides infringements into two
categories: direct infringement and indirect infringement. Each category focuses on
two major groups in online environment: online service providers (OSPs) and
individual end-users. These groups are frequently involved in online activities and
most likely to be the targets of copyright damages. An analysis from such perspective
can facilitate discussion in following chapters.
Chapter III first introduces the basic framework of copyright damages: 1) actual
damages or/and illegal profits; 2) statutory damages. Each category concentrates on
its respectively operation with accompanied cases for illustration. The second portion
analyzes their application in online environment. The analysis based on two
categories: damages upon actual damages or/and illegal profits; statutory damages.

7

For the first category, the analysis focuses more on theoretical aspects; the second
category covers recent cases and several surveys for illustration.
Chapter IV temporarily steps back from discussion in the context of online
background and traces back the origin of damages: property rules & liability rules.
Since property rules are traditionally dominant in copyright law, this chapter
emphasizes more on the interaction between property rules and copyright damages.
The chapter first describes basic concept of property rules and liability rules, then
compares their distinctions. The chapter also describes the dominance of property
rules and exception of liability rules in copyright law. Finally, the chapter will discuss
whether these perceptions can be squarely fits into online environment. The purpose
is to figure out how copyright damages should operate under a correct, updating
guidance as a response to current online infringements. This general guidance serves
as premise to the analysis in next chapter.
Chapter V first introduces the analysis of effective damages model to online
copyright infringement. The model is based on the analysis from last chapter and
copyright policies. A general damages model can become a theoretical guideline to
problems from current copyright damages. The second part looks into more specific
suggestions on respective problems. The suggestions separately focus on the two
categories of copyright damages.
Chapter VI is the conclusion. Based on the above analysis, it concludes that
current copyright damage are enacted in pre-digital age and thus outmoded for online
environment. Moreover, the misunderstanding of property rules worsens the

8

application of copyright damages to online infringement. Apparently, the application
needs to be modified so as to better adapt to the challenges imposed by digital
technologies as well as to achieve copyright policies.

9

Chapter II Evolving Landscape and Emerging Challenge in the New Digital
Era
Throughout history, the interesting interplay between copyright law and
technologies is particularly similar to a real race: the technologies always keep on
emerging and evolving, leading the head of struggling copyright law. The copyright
law, to the contrary, tries to chase technologies even though lag behind again and
again. Like Justice Stevens stated in the case Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., “…from its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response
to significant changes in technology…” 12, which denotes the passive position of
copyright law in the competition.
Copyright originally correlates with reproducing right. However, the evolving
reproducing technologies from printing machine to photography until online “one-clip”
e-copy radically reshape the perceptions of copyright holders and users as well as
business models. Since new reproducing technologies broaden the media of
copyrighted works, right holders are keen on expanding new markets and seeking for
broader protection. Such actions result in the modification of copyright law. Similar
situation also occurs in other technologies. The emergence of digital technologies
challenges the foundation of copyright law again. From fixation requirement to
infringement liability, copyright law is undergone substantial debate by commentators,
lawmakers and judges before drawing a clear conclusion. As a result, new rules come
into play for better copyright enforcement. Every time when a free rider intends to
12

See generally 464 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984) (stating the interrelation between copyright and new

technology).

10

circumvent penalty by updating technologies, the rules always operate as responses.
Among varieties of new rules, the most notable concerns online infringement
liability. Generally, the traditional framework does not fit squarely into online
infringement even though the analysis originated from the traditional framework. For
example, a line of cases from Napster, Amister 13 and Grokster gradually changed the
standard of secondary liability. Thanks to the timely modification, copyright damages
as well as other remedies are able to function in digital era, yet awkwardly.
This chapter will divide into three sections. The first section introduces three
major features of new digital technology that change the traditional landscape of
copyright system. These features are distinguished from their counterparts in the
analog age. Hence, the comparison between the old and new technology will be
beneficial to subsequent analysis--the necessity of modifying the existing damage rule.
Meanwhile, as the premise of copyright damages, it is essential to clarify the criteria
of liability to online infringement. Therefore, the second section discusses how the
technologies force copyright law to react accordingly.
A. Breakthrough to Copyright System: Advanced Digital Technology
The origin of modern copyright law was the enactment of Statute of Anne, which
was the earliest among common law countries. 14 However, the enactment of such
statute was largely due to technology breakthrough. In mid-fifteenth century, the
moveable-type Gutenberg machine remarked a milestone in printing technology. It

13

In re Amister, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).

14

Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International intellectual Property System, 38 LOY.

L .A. REV. 323, 330-54 (2004).

11

greatly reduced the cost of printing process and made reproduction more effectively. 15
Two trends were subsequently triggered by such invention: for one, sharp growth of
printing plants came into being and more literary works were created to meet the
growing demand. For another, printing industries gradually cared for their profits,
which eventually lead to the grant of copyright—limited monopoly on printing.
Apparently, technology growth gave birth to copyright and pushed the evolution. As
time went on, a variety of inventions came into being: photocopiers, film, radio, cable
television, etc. Their contribution concentrated on reproduction and distribution
technologies. In general, the cost of communication is greatly reduced, information
flows increased, diversity of works are possible and high-quality copies can be
expected.
Digital technologies make the progress more reliable and effective. Generally,
digital technologies can be defined as digitization. The process transforms analog data
into digital formation which can be stored or transmitted by digital device like
computer. 16 Almost every kind of works can be digitized, such as an image, sound or
text. 17 Due to digitization, digital technologies offer three major features including
ease of reproduction, speedy distribution and high volume of compression. However,
digitization gradually becomes a double-edge weapon even though it stimulates the
creation of works and facilitates dissemination because copyright holders realize that
15

Brendan Sccot, Copyright in a Frictionless World, FIRST MONDAY,

http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/887/796 (last updated Jul. 6,
2006).
16

Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet Age: The Law and Technology of

Digital Rights Management, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART& ENT. L. 1, 4 (2001).
17

Id.

12

their works can be easily access, copy and distribute than ever.
1. Reproduction
Before digitization comes into play, high-quality copy of work is almost
unavailable. Copying one work from the original always leads to imperfect result. For
example, a photograph will show grains on the surface if enlarged sufficiently; sound
will generate some noise when recorded from a microphone into a tape recorder.18
Digitization, however, creates perfect copies which can be used for further duplication
in high quality. For example, a photograph produced from digital camera can be
transmitted and stored in personal computer with equivalent definition and rarely
degrade the quality. A photocopy, however, gradually blur its image with increasing
times of duplication.
Perfect reproduction lies in the operation of machine-readable language.
Machine-readable language consists of merely one and zero, which is distinguished
from human-readable language. Since almost every kind of information can be turned
into machine-readable language, verbatim duplication actually exists. In this case,
users can enjoy works in the same quality by reproduction. Moreover, the copying
process can be easily completed from several seconds to minutes on personal
computer. This situation no doubt becomes the nightmare to copyright holders.
According to the demonstration from the plaintiff in Napster, at least 87% of the files
on the platform were copyrighted and reproduced without authorization. 19 Similar
situation occurred in software industry. Business software publishers lose
18

Id.

19

Napster, 239. F.3d, at 1013.

13

approximately $7 to$12 billion annually due to piracy. They claimed that each
purchased software CD could be reproduced for additional three to seven copies
within the circle of family or friends. 20 When copyright holders want to enforce their
rights by pursuing these people, they may confront with thousands of individual
end-users. Under the circumstances, the measurement of actual damages becomes
difficult and questionable because no physical copies exist for calculation. Also, the
enforcement costs on individual infringement are usually too high for right holders.
Even large copyright entities, such as the RIAA, would find the massive lawsuits
against individual end-users ineffective.
2. Distribution
The internet and information communication technology (ITC) burgeon a new
platform for copyright system. The internet provides users with full accessibility and
widespread connection. Over the past decades, the internet gradually became an
“advanced high speed, interactive, broadband, digital communications system” and
incorporates most current information networks. 21 Early in 1996, the internet
connected more than two million computers and over twenty million users
worldwide. 22 Until March 2011, the total population of “e-citizens” is more than two
billion. 23 Furthermore, disseminating materials does not cost internet users a lot and
20

Jayashri Srikantiah, the Response of Copyright to the Enforcement Strain of Inexpensive Copying

Technology, 71 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1634, 1635 (1996).
21

The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights: Intellectual Property and the

National Information Infrastructure, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/

(last

updated Aug.01, 2007).
22
23

See Srikantiah, supra note 9, at 1636.
Internet Usage Statistics: World Internet Users and Population Stats, INTERNET WORLD STATS,

http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (lase updated Apr. 28, 2012).
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does not sorely belong to the publishers any more. A survey conducted in 2003 by
Pew Internet and American Life Project pointed out that 44% of U.S. internet users
had the experience of uploading materials online. 24 Forty percent of them only have
annual income of $30,000 or less. 25 Because each user can easily access and process
copyrighted works, the quantities of users imposes heavy burden to copyright holders
for their enforcement.
On the other hand, the ITC keeps on evolving from the very beginning of its
emergence. A high profile example was the bulletin board. A personal computer with
valid internet connection plus bulletin board software can create a platform to
exchange information. Such easy operation enables most users to upload or download
large amounts of digitized works at low cost such as a text file, a sound recording or
an image. 26 As a result, copyright holders suffer from substantial losses. One case in
point that happened in 1994 when a college student in Minnesota uploaded thousands
of copyrighted software onto his bulletin board and allowed other users to download
them freely, which claimed for $1.5 billion losses of software sales. 27
With the development of digital technologies, online users call for more efficient
ITC platform to increase their enjoyment. The peer-to-peer (P2P) platform is the very
technology that satisfies their requirement. The P2P technology enables users to
upload or download materials in great volume and high speed than ever. The
24

Amanda Lenhart, Content Creation Online, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,

http://www.pewinternet.org/Press-Releases/2004/Content-Creation-Online.aspx. (last updated Feb. 29,
2004).
25

Id.

26

See Srikantiah, supra note 9, at1636.

27

Barbara Carton, Man Charged in Software Piracy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1994, at 41.

15

development of P2P technology had gone through two major phases: centralized
indexing and decentralized indexing. 28 Early in the mid-1990, programmers began to
design networks that facilitated their clients for internet activities. 29 Such technology
only allowed users to retrieve contents from a given network and users could not
transmit contents back. 30 Such centralized file-sharing platform, however, can be
easily used for online infringements.
To immune from infringement liability, technicians updated their file-sharing
platform into a more advanced version—decentralized, user-driven platform, 31 such
as the Grokster platform. The mechanism is simple. A user merely need to download
and install the P2P software into his personal computer, and then create an account.
When he logs onto the account, he can upload or download contents with other users
who have different accounts regardless their specific location. Compared with the
centralized system, the decentralized system requires less administration by the
system providers.
From bulletin board to P2P file-sharing platform, evolving digital technologies
greatly reshapes traditional perception of copyright system. Online users now can
access and process works costless than ever because of the removal of physical copies.
Also, the “first-sale doctrine” becomes meaningless because online users can still
retain electronic copies after the distribution online. Moreover, online users can
28

Andrew J. Lee, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. & In re Amister Litigation: A Study of

Secondary Copyright Liability in the Peer-to-Peer Context, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 485, 491 (2005).
29

Id. at 489.

30

Id.

31

Elizabeth Miles, Note, In re Amister & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-to-Peer and the Sony

Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21, 26 (2004).

16

simultaneously access contents and repeated their actions all the time, which increases
the opportunities of illegal use and enhances the difficulty of detection. Therefore,
these features can be problematic to each right holder when it comes to enforcement
issue.
3. Compression
To be eligible for copyright protection, a given work needs to be fixed on certain
media after creation. Before the appearance of digital media, all copyrighted works
are fixed on physical media. Physical media usually cannot cover so many contents as
digital media. Just image the high volumes of case reporters in a law library compared
with popular legal database like Westlaw or LexisNexis. Advanced compression
technology now enables extremely large quantity of contents to be stored in small,
manageable size. Moving Picture Experts Group’s mpeg-1 audio layer 3 algorithm
(MP3) was the very example of progressive compression. 32 MP3 is a standard
compression unit that allows music files to be compressed in a size of one to twelfth
of the original version. 33 Another similar compression device for video is DiVX,
which compresses a 5 gigabyte DVD into 650 megabytes CD-R. 34 Furthermore, the
popular iPod-Nano exemplifies the feature of high quantity storage in small size. This
digital media player was introduced in late 2005 and has gone through six generations.
The latest sixth generation have s storage of 16GB with only 1.54 inch square
display. 35
32

See Kramarsky, supra note 16, at 7.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

IPod Nano, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPod_Nano#Sixth_generation (last updated May.

17

Compression of huge information laid a good foundation for further
dissemination online. An entire uploaded CD with musical files can be downloaded
into one MP3 within twenty minutes. 36 Based on the statistics, one can anticipate that
the impact on copyright holders by using a 64G IPod for downloading from a P2P
file-sharing platform.
Ease of reproduction, speedy distribution and high volume compression challenge
traditional copyright system and threaten each copyright holder. Making an electronic
copy online simply requires several “clicks” and cost merely several seconds or
minutes. The quality of electronic copy can totally fulfill the need of users due to
perfect duplication: no noise in sound track or blurring in image. Furthermore, large
amounts of users can easily access and process online works simultaneously. Anyone
from a CEO to a household wife can become illegal users because of the low costs.
Moreover, new and evolving network platforms facilitate the process. Finally,
renovated digital devices increase information storage on one hand, facilitates online
illegal dissemination on the other hand.
Evolving digital technologies bring about challenging features that can be
deemed as double-edge weapons. It stimulates the creation of works, accelerates the
dissemination of information and facilitates accessibility of users. However, the threat
out of unauthorized use still exists and gradually become rampant on the internet. To
make matter worse, online infringements do not share equivalent features as offline
infringers. Some online infringers do not fall squarely into the traditional standard of
19, /2012).
36

See Kramarsky, supra note 16, at 7.

18

liability. Therefore, clarifying a proper standard of liability to online infringement
serves as premise to the analysis of copyright damages.
B. Direct Infringement in New Environment
Traditionally, copyright infringement originates from direct infringement. In
theory, it occurs when anyone except for the copyright holders exercise the exclusive
rights without authorization. This framework fits into almost every jurisdiction in the
world. For example, §106 of US 1976 Copyright Act recognizes six exclusive rights
to copyright owner: reproduction; adaption; distribution; publicly perform, publicly
display and digital audio transmission of sound recording. 37 If an accused commits
action that falls within the above enumerated rights without authorization, he infringes
the copyright. Therefore, the framework of copyright infringement can be roughly
defined as follow: 1) valid copyright and ownership; 2) unauthorized exploitation of
statutory exclusive copyright.
Despite digital technology has changed the landscape of copyright system and
brought about unexpected side effects, the framework of infringement still remain the
same when applied to online environment. Online platform in nature functions for
storage and transmission, just as offline media. No distinction exists between a
musical website and a physical CD when both are used for storage of pirated songs.
Currently there are two types of direct infringements online: 1) infringement by OSPs;
2) infringement by individual end-users. The basic framework of the first type is esay
to define. Judge Rakoff in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. pointed out, “the

37

17 U.S.C. §106.

19

complex marvels of cyberspatial communication ay create difficult legal issues; but
not in this case. Defendant’s infringement of plaintiff’s copyright is clear.” 38 The
second type develops with the emergence of internet and ITC, and embraces its
popularization when P2P file-sharing platforms come into being. Two recent cases,
Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset 39and Sony BMG Music Entertainment v.
Tenenbuam 40, cause heated debate on the reasonability of lawsuits against individual
end-users.
1. Direct infringement by OSPs
Online Service Providers, known as OSPs, offer variety of services to online
users. For example: E-commerce, online entertainment (music, movie, etc.), online
communication (e-mail, live-chat, etc.), information search (Google, Wikipedia,
Baidu, etc.) Almost every kind of service contains copyright contents. Hence, OSPs
can easily infringe copyright by intent or negligent. In offline world, an individual
entity can become the source for distribution of pirated copies, such as CD shopping
site along the street, flea market, etc. As to online environment, the situation remains
the same. A single website can store thousands of pirated works and serve as source
for further distribution. The MP3.com case is a high profile example.
MP3.com was a professional website which stored and distributed music to its
users, and offered relevant information as well as technology support online. In
January 2000, the MP3.com launched a new service called “My.MP3.com” which

38

92 F. Supp. 2d 349, at 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

39

680 F. Supp.2d, 1045 (2010).

40

672 F. Supp.2d, 217 (2009).

20

allowed legal CD purchasers to convert the songs from their CDs to the website. In
exchange for the uploading, they could also freely access to songs from other CDs. 41
Soon after the MP3.com converted “tens of thousands of popular CDs” into the MP3
format and stored them on its servers. 42 The only requirement for users to access
those songs was to prove either 1) they legally own the CD or 2) purchase a CD from
MP3.com affiliate retailers online. 43 Although the operation continued, several record
companies sued MP3.com for infringement of their sound recording copyright.
The court held in favor of plaintiffs and stated that the defendant actually copied
the converted version of songs from plaintiffs’ CDs, and replayed them to its users
without permission from copyright owners.

44

This action violated the exclusive

rights recognized in §106 of Copyright Act. 45 Though MP3.com argued for “fair use”
defense, the court rejected for the following reasons: 1) the defendant was commercial
in nature; 2) the copying action harmed the value of plaintiff’s work and their
potential market; 3) MP3.com copied entire portion of works; 4) the works being
copied “close to the core of copyright protection”. 46
Similarly, another OSP in China committed the same action like MP3.com. In
Dec.2006, Columbia Pictures found the Sohu.com, a popular online service provider,
offered its users unauthorized access to online video database. 47 Such video database
41
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contained hundreds of copyrighted movies from Columbia Pictures and other
studios. 48 The Columbia Picture subsequently filed a suit against Sohu.com, claiming
that such unauthorized access and online live playing of those movies committed
copyright infringement. 49 The court ruled the Sohu.com had infringed Columbia
Pictures’ rights of communication through information networks, which is recognized
in the 2006 Regulation on the Protection of the Right to Network Dissemination of
Information.

50

Specifically, Sohu.com provided unauthorized access of the online

video to its users for playing, yet did not get permission from Colombia Pictures. As a
copyright holder, Columbia Pictures was entitled to the protection of right to network
dissemination. Any performance of the works through information network should
obtain permission form Columbia Pictures. 51 Therefore, the court ordered Sohu.com
published public apology on its home page for consecutive three days and paid RMB
191,000 (US$23,000) as damage. 52
Direct infringement by OSPs mostly occurred in early digital age. For one, OSPs
offer a higher level of service due to the progressive features by digital technologies
so that many online users were attracted by the enjoyment, which increase the
opportunity of infringement. For another, such infringement share equivalent features
to offline direct infringement, and can be easily defined. Courts among different

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

See Art. 2, 18 (1) of 2006 Network Regulation. Full texts and English Translation are available at

http://bl-law-komodo.ads.iu.edu:2252/display.aspx?id=5224&lib=law&SearchKeyword=copyright&Se
archCKeyword=.
51

See Sohu.com., at 1.

52

Id. at 5.

22

jurisdictions tended to fits traditional standard of liability into cyberspace and
expanded the protection of copyright owners so as to enforce their rights. In general,
online service providers committed infringement the same as other infringement in
offline environment. The transformation of physical works into “one or zero” binary
code, though revolutionary, does not change the nature of such infringement. OSPs
ordinarily focus on commercial benefits and sometimes cause financial harm to
copyright holders. Although such financial harm often serves as a reliable basis to
claim for damages, the measurement of such harm is not simple. Next chapter looks
into specific problems of the measurement.
2. Direct infringement by individual end-users
Although online service providers play an important role in cyberspace and are
still undergone evolution, their infringements are less frequently found in recent
judicial practice. This is partly due to the “Safe Harbor” provision that immunes OSPs
liability, partly because of technology progress enable OSPs functions more like a
bridge than a warehouse. Therefore, copyright holders need to shift their attention to
another group who most likely committed direct infringement: individual end-users.
Individual end-users existed since the creation of valid information network on
the internet. A personal computer with valid network connection makes private
exploitation of online works possible. So, copyright infringement by end-users
appeared in the early age of cyberspace. For example, sending an e-mail with
copyrighted works committed infringement of distribution right, and the receiving of
works leads to the violation of reproduction right. With the emergence and updating
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of P2P technology, more and more individual end-users may infringe copyright
online.
Direct infringement by individual end-users is distinguished from those by OSPs.
Despite the rapid growth of OSPs, the quantities of direct infringements still are less
than. The establishment of a valid online service provider demands protocols like
TCP/IP and RADIUS, domain name service (DNS), several size service running
software (Red Hat Linux), email address, etc. 53 To access the internet, by contrast,
one simply need a valid network connection with personal computer. So, the ease of
becoming end-users greatly increases the opportunities for online infringement and
thus causes harm to copyright holders. In Napster, the district court ruled that
defendant’s users were engaged in wholesale reproduction and distribution of
copyrighted works. 54 The plaintiff also submitted a survey by its expert, Michael Fine,
to show the irreparable harm caused by illegal file-sharing. 55 The survey indicated
that online file-sharing had resulted in big losses of “album” sales around college
markets. 56
Looking into the members of individual end-users, large commercial infringers
and non-commercial home-style ones consist of the group. Therefore, complicated
structure is another feature. Under the circumstances, rough punishment without
discretion would increase the costs of enforcement and lead to unjust results. The

53

Boatner Howell, What do I need to start an ISP?—Essential Items and Industrial Knowledge,

ALLIANCE DATA.COM, http://www.alliancedatacom.com/isp/start_isp.asp (last updated May.24, 2012).
54

See 239 F .3d, at 1004.

55

Id. at 1017-1018.

56

Id.

24

famous trade organization, Recording Industry Association of American (RIAA),
began a legal campaign against individual end-users in 2003. 57 Over the past five
years, RIAA had filed lawsuits against approximately 35,000 individual end-users. 58
Since large quantities of end-users were charged without being distinguished, some of
them were inevitably imposed unjust punishment. In the verdict of Thomas trial, the
jury found willfully infringement by the defendant and awarded $220,000 in total for
statutory damages, with $9,250 per work. 59 After the defendant filed a motion for
new trial, the figures increased to $80,000 per work ($1,920,000 in total), regardless
of the fact that defendant is a single, household mother who only infringed 24 songs. 60
Pursing individual end-users for infringement proves to be costly and ineffective.
In the late 2008, the RIAA’s announcement of ceasing lawsuits against individual
end-users remarked the failure of the five-year campaign. For one, the RIAA
spokesman admitted that the record labels had lost money in the campaign. 61 For
another, the campaign caused aversions from public and negative comments from
courts. 62 As Judge James Otero commented in Elektra v. O’Brien
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lawsuits, potentially meritorious legal and factual defenses are not being litigated, and
instead, the federal judiciary is being used as a hammer by a small group of plaintiffs
to pound settlements out of unrepresented defendants…” 64
C. Indirect Infringement: from traditional liability to new concept
Indirect infringement is not new. Rather, it existed before the emergence of digital
technologies and internet. Basically, one can be liable as a related infringer of other’s
infringement activities. 65 Such concept originated from the liability of tort law
because copyright infringement is tort in nature. 66 When it comes to the digital age,
however, the indirect infringement causes some confusion to current standard of
liability. Under the circumstances, lawmakers and judges have to reexamine the rule
and make modification.
Generally, the 1976 US Copyright Act does not provide statutory framework for
indirect copyright infringement. The existing framework originated from courts’
holding which developed from common law of torts. Traditional indirect liability in
tort law covers contributory infringement and vicarious liability. The contributory
infringement means that one who directly contributes to other’s infringement and
should be liable for his action. 67 To establish contributory infringement, the plaintiff
needs to prove: 1) actual direct infringement occurs; 2) the accused contributory
tortfeasor has actual or constructive knowledge of the direct infringement; 3) the
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accused causes or materially contributes to the direct infringement. 68
On the other hand, vicarious liability functions differently. The concept was
developed from the extension of agency principles by Second Circuit. 69 Specifically,
when one has the power to supervise or control the direct infringement, and
simultaneously has financial benefits from such action, one is liable for vicarious
liability, regardless his knowledge of direct infringement. 70 To prevail in a vicarious
suit, plaintiff must show: 1) direct infringement occurs; 2) the accused vicarious
tortfeasor has the right or power to control or supervise the direct infringement; 3) the
accused gain direct financial benefit out of the direct infringement. 71
One of the earliest case containing both contributory infringement and vicarious
liability was Religious Technology Center v. Netcom. 72 The Netcom was an online
service provider that allowed internet news group to make copy of the plaintiff’s
copyrighted work through bulletin board service (BBS) without authorization. 73
The court ruled that Netcom was not liable for vicarious liability since neither
Netcom nor the BBS received direct financial benefits from the posting action. 74 As
to contributory infringement, the court reasoned that Netcom was liable for such
liability because of the fact that it had actual knowledge of the direct infringement. 75
The Netcom case is a high profile example of successful applying traditional
68
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secondary liability into online environment. Such application, however, does not
always squarely fit into specific cases. As aforementioned, the evolution of digital
technologies continuously reshapes the perception of copyright. Within a line of cases,
the Napster 76 was the most famous and influential one.
Napster was a P2P file-sharing platform and distributed free software through its
homepage. Once the software was installed, the user could access Napster system and
create an account. 77 The user then could upload MP3 files in correct format onto the
platform through his account and enabled others to download. 78 Napster platform did
not keep MP3 files on its centralized indexing system, but merely facilitated the
distribution. 79
The plaintiff, music industry, admitted that Napster did not committed direct
infringement due to the technology design. Rather, the plaintiff claimed contributory
infringement and vicarious liability of Napster. As to contributory infringement, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Napster had actual knowledge of direct infringement by
its end-users. The internal company e-mails with the list of 12,000 infringing files
provided by RIAA sufficed as evidence. Moreover, Napster materially contributed to
the infringing actions because it offered platform and software to users primarily for
illegal

file-sharing.

80

Therefore,

Napster

infringement.
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actually

committed

contributory

When considering vicarious liability, the court upheld the lower court’s finding
that Napster had the ability to control infringing actions because it could “block”
access of users to the system. 81 With regard to direct financial benefits, the court
reasoned that Napster “acted as a ‘draw’ for customers”, because the revenue directly
related to the frequency of advertisement viewed on the platform. 82
The Napster case is highly influential because it denotes the application of
traditional secondary liability into online copyright infringement is operable. However,
technologies never stop the pace. The centralized indexing Napster is merely a
prototype of P2P file-sharing platform. The next generation of P2P, decentralized
indexing system, makes the analysis of secondary liability outdated. This time,
however, the US Supreme Court created a new theory called “inducement liability”
borrowed from patent law to address the troublesome issue. 83
As aforementioned, the Grokster platform differs significantly from that of
Napster. Unlike centralized indexing system, the Grokster system created
decentralized indexing modes, which enabled its users to retain index of files for
future sharing. 84 The Grokster cannot control its users’ conduct after they install the
software. 85 The inability of control actually circumvented the finding of vicarious
liability.
In Ninth Circuit, the court rejected the finding that Grokster had actual or
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constructive knowledge of its users’ infringement. 86 The court based on the Sony
doctrine and reasoned that Grokster was capable of substantial non-infringing use. 87
The Supreme Court, however, held the Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony doctrine by
omitting the business mode of Grokster, “One who distributes a device with the object
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third party.” 88
Judging from the aforementioned, traditional standard of liability can mostly
applied to online infringement. In general, online secondary liability develops from
existing case. To summarize, indirect liability consists of the following elements: 1)
involved in the direct infringement either by control or just as facilitator; 2)
knowledge of infringement action; 3) derive financial benefits from infringement.
Technologies keep on evolving, and no one can predict the future. Digital
technologies, as a double edge weapon, bring about convenience yet threaten the
foundation of copyright system. Ease of reproduction, widespread distribution, and
high volume compression remarkably reshape the process of creation and
dissemination. As a response, lawmakers and judges refer to rules within or beyond
copyright field to fit digital technologies squarely into current framework. Generally,
the framework works well when applied to known and mainstream technologies, but
future breakthroughs still intimidate copyright holders and force copyright law react
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actively.
The finding of infringement liability is merely the first step. The second and more
important step, effective and equitable remedy, is the only way that cures the harm
suffered by copyright holders and deters illegal actions. Copyright damages, as the
only monetary relief in copyright law, generally function well as ex post remedy in
offline practice. When it comes to online environment, however, copyright damages
gradually become ineffective.
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Chapter III Response to New Challenges: Copyright Damages in Online
Environment
Because intellectual products share the features of public goods, government
grants limited monopoly to copyright holders so as to rectify market failure. Relying
on such monopoly, copyright holders should be able to exploit their works and gain
substantial benefits. The reality, however, sharply departs from the theory. Copyright
infringement intervene copyright holders’ normal exploitation of works. Under the
circumstances, copyright remedies become the last resort for copyright holders to
effective enforce their rights.
Among varieties of copyright remedies, damages are the only monetary relief
which recoup copyright holders with financial benefits. Financial losses caused by
infringements call for damage as ex post solution, because copyright establish on
utilitarian concept. Copyright infringements are torts in nature and cause financial
harm to right holder. Hence, copyright damages primarily design to fully compensate
copyright holders’ actual damages. In theory, the damages should be equivalent to the
losses of copyright holders. Following the compensation, the next step should be the
deprivation of unjust enrichment: illegal profits of infringers. The underlying purpose
is to deter infringement and make infringers unprofitable. Basically, copyright
damages function well when both compensation and deterrence can be achieved.
Entering into the digital age, copyright damages confront with advanced
technologies. As a whole new platform, the online environment challenges the
operation of damages and questions the effectiveness. Evolutionary digital
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technologies significantly change the process of creation. Copyright damages, by
contrast, existed long before the emergence of digital technology and were primarily
design for offline infringements. Obviously, current damages framework is outmoded.
For example, the measurement of damages upon actual damages is unreliable and
difficult. Sometimes it is impossible to make the damages proof beyond speculation.
Moreover, online infringements rarely generate profits, which cannot meet the
standard of proof either. To make matter worse, more problems triggered when
statutory damages applied to online infringements. With gradual updating copyright
law, it is unpersuasive to remain damages framework alone intact.
This chapter primarily discusses copyright damages in online environment. In the
first section, the chapter looks into basic framework of copyright damages: actual
damages or/and illegal profits and statutory damages. The second section analyzes the
problems of applying copyright damages to online infringement.
A. Fundamental Mechanism of Copyright Damages
1. Actual damages or/and profits
Generally, Awarding damages upon actual damages or/and illegal profits is the
earliest and major damages in most jurisdictions. The purpose of awarding damages
in this category is to compensate copyright holders. The degree of compensation
determines whether such kind of damage preserves sufficient incentive to copyright
holders after infringements occur. Sufficient compensation can eliminate financial
harm by infringement as if no infringements occur. Under the circumstances,
copyright holders will continue their creation in the future, and the public will benefit
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from abundant cultural production. On the other hand, granting damages on
infringer’s profits chiefly deters and punishes unjust enrichment. Disgorgement of
illegal profits makes infringement meaningless because infringers are not better off
financially.
In theory, a plaintiff in a copyright dispute can recover both his actual damages or
illegal profits of infringers, or the combination of the two. §504(b) of US Copyright
Act provides that “the copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages
suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing
the actual damages.” 89 When choosing illegal profits, a plaintiff cannot recoup profits
that have already been converted into the calculation of damages in order to preclude
double recovery. 90 In practice, plaintiff often choose either actual damages or illegal
profits provides that most plaintiff can prove financial harm and meet the standard of
proof, while the possibility of gaining the two exists. 91 For example, an author
markets his science fiction but the fiction is pirated by an infringer. Because of the
infringement, the author can claim either lost sales as actual damages or infringer’s
sales as profits, given that the infringing copies are equivalent in quality to original
works. On the contrary, if the infringing copies prove to be inferior in quality and
diminish the copyright owner’s ability to market the fiction in the future, the profits
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can be awarded as well as lost sales.
Both actual damages and profits require proof without speculation. Courts in
copyright dispute are entitled to reject plaintiff’s claim for damages if the proof is
speculative. 92 In some situations, courts might ease the burden of proof. The court in
Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Sys., Inc. 93 held that once the fact of actual damages was
proved, the degree of harm did not need to be proved to exact certainty. 94 Despite the
easement, actual damages are not easy to prove. Generally, actual damages are based
on the consideration that whether infringements lead to diminution of market value of
works, and the degree has a final voice on the amount of awarded damages. When
infringements occur, the depreciated market value is often measured as actual
damages to copyright holders.
The measurement of decreasing market value requires several considerations. The
first step is to decide the fair market value: an estimate of market price on a given
work which depends on what a knowledgeable, willing, and unpressured buyer would
pay to similar level seller in the market. 95 Usually, the fair market value can refer to
market precedents. However, sometimes there is not existing market for a given work.
On that condition, courts would measure the fair market value as the amount that a
plaintiff would reasonably have received or a defendant would reasonably have
paid. 96 After the determination, the subsequent step is to calculate the lost sales as the
92
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result of infringement. The plaintiff has several methods to prove the actual damages:
he can establish actual sales during pre-infringement period and use such figure to
predict lost sales during infringement period. Also, he can use infringers’ sales of
infringing copies as lost sales. Furthermore, he can compare sales of infringing copies
with the sales of remaining copyrighted works and use the difference to calculate the
lost sales. 97 The final step is to prove causation. This issue closely relates to lost sales.
Briefly summarize, the factors that affect the measurement in copyright dispute
include: (1) the distinction of marketing efforts between plaintiff and defendant; (2)
different prices of works and pirated copies; (3) varying competition levels between
plaintiff and defendant; and (4) cost that affecting profits between plaintiff and
defendant. 98
Because of the complication and difficulty, plaintiffs are more willing to choose
illegal profits instead of actual damages. §504 (b) provides that: “in establishing the
infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of infringer’s
gross revenue.” 99 After proving the gross revenue, the burden of proof is shifted to
defendant of proving deductible costs due to factors other than infringement. 100The
primary purpose of profits recovery is to deprive defendants of unjust enrichment.
The 1976 US Copyright Act, however, does not specify how to calculate deductible
costs. Several cases indicated that costs correlate to infringing activities with
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reasonable and certainty proof can be deductible, such as taxes, royalties to authors,
overhead and production costs. 101 On the other hand, courts would favor plaintiff and
grant gross revenue as damages when defendant cannot meet the standard of proof.
Another concern to profits issue is the apportionment. A plaintiff can only claim
and recover profits attributable to infringement, and is not entitled to profits without
connection to infringing action. 102 Frequently, several situations complicate the
process. One situation is that non-infringing factors sometimes contribute to the
profits of defendants, like the success of an infringing novel is due to effective
advertising campaign rather than the novel itself. Another one is the collaboration of
works. For example, the composer of a song incorporated into a popular movie cannot
claim for the whole profits of that movie. Despite of the difficulty, a defendant can
effectively reduce available profits to plaintiff by proving such profits are not
attributable to infringement. One case in point is Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp. 103 In this case, the Court approved only twenty percent of profits in the motion
picture were attributable to plaintiff’s copyrighted play. The Court held that some
aspects of the success to the motion picture were unrelated to plaintiff’s work, “The
testimony showed quite clearly that in the creation of profits from the exhibition of a
motion picture, the talent and popularity of the ‘motion picture stars’ generally
constitutes the main drawing power of the picture…Here, it appeared that the picture
101

See e.g., Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826 (9th Cir 1985) (stating that

advertising cost should be deductible from gross revenue claimed by plaintiff); Kamar Int’l v. Russ
Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating overhead expenses by infringer that contributed to
infringement cannot be accounted into profits).
102

17 U.S.C. §504(b).

103

309 U.S. 390 (1940).

37

did not bear the title of the copyrighted play and that it was not presented or
advertised as having any connection whatever with the play.” 104
2. Statutory damages
Statutory damages are another branch in copyright damages system. Although not
typical, statutory damages gradually become the indispensable component. The
existence of statutory damages is largely due to the fact that the first kind of copyright
damages, actual damages or/and profits, is speculative and difficult to prove. The
history of statutory damages, however, can dates back to eighteen century England
when copyright disputes were brought in the courts of equity with discretion upon
awarding. 105 Therefore, statutory damages share some equitable features from
common law jurisprudence—“high degree of flexibility; regardless of actual proof;
functions due to the failure of other damage.” 106 On the other hand, the framework of
statutory damages is simple: the awarding of statutory damages substitutes actual
damages or/and profits at the discretion of courts within a statutory range. The range
is determined by legislation and courts award specific amount according to the
culpability of infringement and justice.
Statutory damages accompanied with US copyright law ever since its first
enactment. Early in 1790, the first federal copyright act provided that: “…then such
offender or offenders shall…forfeit and pay the sum of fifty cents for every infringing
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sheet which shall be found in his or their possession…” 107 The 1909 Act actually
made statutory damages the prominent component in copyright law. Under 1909 Act,
a plaintiff can choose statutory damages in place of actual damages or/and profits
when “such damages as…the court shall appear to be just.” 108 Meanwhile, infringers
under such provision should be liable for every infringement activity—“two separate
infringements of the same copyrighted work result in two separate claims for
minimum damages.” 109 This was the basic framework of statutory damages on
multiple infringements, which increased both the burden of infringers and the amount
of damages. As to the statutory range, US Congress set minimum $250 and maximum
$5,000 to each infringement and granted courts discretion to award damages between
the two. 110
Despite the simple structure, statutory damages cause some unpleasant results in
practice. Some courts required the plaintiff to prove actual damages resulting from
infringement before considering statutory damages. 111 Courts also doubt whether
they had to award actual damages or elect to award statutory damages under 1909
Act. 112 Moreover, the 1909 Act did not clearly address the issue of innocent
infringers. Commentators argued that the statutory minimum, $250 per infringed work,
imposed harsh penalty upon innocent infringers, because innocent infringers did not
107
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aware and had no reason to know that they conduct infringements. 113 Such situation
may deteriorate when innocent infringers conduct multiple infringements without
awareness.
Facing with more and more negative comments, the 1976 Act modified the
statutory damages provision and presented a departure from the framework in 1909
Act. §504 (c)(1)(B) generally provided that statutory damages are one of the
copyright damages in 1976 Act. 114 The revised version primarily focused on several
controversial issues in 1909 Act, such as when statutory damages could be awarded;
how to measure multiple infringement cases 115; and how to deal with harshness of
minimum award to innocent infringers. 116
The first and most prominent modification under 1976 Act was the right of a
plaintiff to freely elect statutory damages in lieu of actual damages or/and profits at
any time prior to the final judgment. 117 It was an absolute right regardless of the
sufficiency of evidence to actual damages or profits. 118 The House Report further
indicated that a plaintiff might intentionally elect statutory damages even though
adequate proof existed. 119
The second improvement of new provision was regarding the minimum $250
award. §504(c) alleviated the harshness to innocent infringers by introducing $100
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minimum award in case innocent infringement was proved. 120 Since innocent
infringers did not aware or had no reason to know that they infringed copyright, they
should not become the major target of detergence. Awarding statutory damages
against innocent infringers should only compensate copyright holders. The minimum
$100 amount could avoid the negative impact upon innocent infringers and stroke a
balance between copyright holders and users.
Awarding statutory damages upon multiple infringements also presented a whole
new structure. §504 (c) entitled a plaintiff to recover only a single statutory damages
regardless of how many times a defendant infringed the work or whether the
infringing acts are separated, simultaneous, or occurred sequentially. 121 The amount
of single award depended on the number of infringements; market value of the work;
revenue losses by infringement; the culpability of infringement; and the defendant’s
fault. 122
Because the award focuses on single work, the definition of “work” is
substantially important in copyright dispute, especially when collaborative works
become popular with the development of multimedia technologies. For example, a
CD that contains 24 songs will be deemed as a single work under statutory damages.
In MP3.com, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that statutory damages should be
awarded on each sound track in a CD uploaded into infringer’s website because of
“individual economic value” of every sound track. 123
120
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One noteworthy feature of US statutory damages is the varying statutory range.
The 1909 Act provided that courts could award statutory damages no less than $250
and no more than $5,000. 124 The 1976 Act increased the maximum amount to
$10,000 against ordinary infringements. 125 When it comes to willful infringement,
the maximum amount could be $50,000. If the infringement is found to be innocents,
the amount decreased to $100. 126 In 1988, US Congress passed the Berne Convention
Implementation Act and doubled the statutory range so as to comply with the Act. 127
The minimum increased to $500 and the maximum became $20,000. 128 Additionally,
the amount to willful infringements increased to $100,000 and the amount for
innocent infringements became $200. 129 Eleven years later, US Congress changed the
range again. The Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act
set out the statutory range from $750 to $30,000 within ordinary infringements. 130
The maximum award to willful infringement increased to $150,000, while remained
the $200 to innocent infringements. 131 The Congress primarily intended to deter and
punished all future infringers by increasing the penalty. 132
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B. Copyright Damages in Online Environment: Problems
Copyright damages are the indispensable instrument to right holders for
enforcement. As the scope of copyright gradually broadens and new subject matters
keep on emerging, copyright damages hereby are awarded broader than ever as a
response. Digital technologies, however, always challenge the framework and
operation of copyright damages. As the mainstream in copyright remedies, damages
upon actual damages or/and profits seems outmoded in online environment and are
used in a relatively low frequency. On the other hand, statutory damages become a
more attractive choice, but give rise to problems in practice. After eleven years of
entering into new century, it is time to reexamine that whether the framework and
rationale of copyright damages still squarely fits into online infringements.
1. Damages upon actual damages or/and profits
a) Actual damages
To claim damages upon actual damages, a plaintiff should prove the losses
without speculation. This standard does not change in online infringement. Hence, the
first step is to question whether there are actual damages to copyright holders as a
result of online infringements. The answer seems self-evident: digital technologies
enable easy reproduction and widespread distribution online which means several
clicks and seconds can complete copyright infringement. Moreover, every act of
infringement causes some harm to the copyright holder because lack of such
infringement, the infringer would have to purchase the work for use. 133 So, copyright
133
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holders will be recouped by such payment. Equipped with advanced digital
technologies, the situation deteriorates. Such argument is often used by RIAA when
they justify their lawsuits against individual end-users on P2P file-sharing platform.
They posted on their website an array of statistics to illustrate the harm and damages
due to this kind of infringement: “(1) in the decade since peer-to-peer (p2p)
file-sharing site Napster emerged in 1999, music sales in the U.S. have dropped 47
percent, from $14.6 billion to $7.7 billion; (2) from 2004 through 2009 alone,
approximately 30 billion songs were illegally downloaded on file-sharing networks;
(3) NPD reports that only 37 percent of music acquired by U.S. consumers in 2009
was paid for.” 134 By presenting these horrible astronomical figures, RIAA wish to
force the public to believe online infringements indeed cause actual damages to them.
Suffering damages by infringements is not enough to prevail in a copyright
dispute. To prevail, the plaintiff needs to prove it beyond speculation. This second
step is determinative to the final awarding. Unfortunately, online copyright
infringements usually give rise to great difficulty to copyright holders on providing
certainty proof. As aforementioned, the most difficult mission for a plaintiff is to
prove the causation link between actual damages and infringements. 135 Currently
some debates still exist on how illegal P2P file-sharing affect legal copyright sales. A
survey conducted by researchers from Harvard University and University of Kansas
revealed that illegal downloads through P2P platform only accounts for 0.7 percent of
reduction on CD sales, and argued that actual damages to record industry may be
134
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trivial. 136 Even the RIAA admitted on its website that “…calculating lost sales for
online piracy…is a difficult task…” and cannot provide the public with even an
approximate figure. 137 In Thomas-Rasset 138 , the head of Sony BMG’s litigation
department testified that they had no idea of the actual damages they suffered due to
illegal downloading. 139 Without certainty proof of causation link, RIAA could not
meet the standard of proof and obtained support from courts to the awarding damage
upon actual damages. Similar situation occurs in two Chinese cases. In Chen
Xingliang v. Digital Library, 140 HaiDian district court rejected the plaintiff’s claim of
RMB 400,000 as actual damages due to infringement by defendant. The court
reasoned that the plaintiff did not provide any convincing evidence to the causation
link between the amount of his actual damages and infringement action. 141 Also, the
court in Zhang ZhiCheng v. 21 ViaNet.Com

142

did not support the plaintiff’s claimed

amount of actual damages due to his failure to provide certainty proof. 143
Proving actual damages beyond speculation is not the only obstacle for copyright
holders. The criteria of calculation also call for consideration. Online commercial
platforms emerged later than offline markets, and major offline merchants do not keen
on exploring the online markets even if such markets may be more profitable. For
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example, RIAA did not enter into digital market for music until 2004. 144 Distinctions
exist between online commercial websites and offline physical markets, like different
business models and the sales channels. Awarding damage based on offline market
statistics can either underestimate or over-evaluate online copyright works, resulting
insufficient compensation or over compensation. Therefore, unambiguous guidance is
instrumental for courts in calculation. For example, the 2005 China’s Guiding
Opinions set forth some specific instructions on the calculation of damages to online
copyright infringement. Article 26 provides that the amount of damages can be
determined pursuant to the author’s remuneration as prescribed by State in case of
distributing literary works. 145 Furthermore, Article 32 allows courts to increase the
amount of final damages from three to five times. 146 However, the author’s
remuneration is prescribed by State before the invention of internet. The distinctive
features of digital technologies on creation and dissemination had not been taken into
consideration: the costs of making a copy are far less than producing a physical one;
and distribution of copies online saves the costs of offline dissemination. Therefore,
the factors that affect offline markets pricing do not similarly exist in online
environment. Even if legislators take these factors into consideration, the law still
cannot keep the pace with progressive technologies and eventually become outmoded.
Hence, statutory standard of calculation cannot solve problems in practice.
b) Illegal profits
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Compared with proving actual damages, seeking for infringer’s profits can be
much easier, at least in theory. Generally, copyright holders in a dispute merely need
to present the proof of gross revenue by infringements and leave infringers to deduct
costs. The ease on burden of proof, however, does not aid copyright holders too much.
Currently, online infringements conducted either by online intermediary like OSPs or
individual end-users. It is obvious that copyright holders can only claim profits as
damages from the two groups.
Online service providers offer varieties of services, many of these services are free
to online users. For example, Google Map does not charge when one locate favorite
restaurants. Profits to OSPs usually come through two channels: some OSPs charge
for their services and users are required to pay subscription fees in order to access
contents or information. In addition to subscription fees, OSPs gain more financial
benefits by charging advertisement posted on their websites. Interesting contents
attract more users and create better opportunities for advertisement. As a result, OSPs
can charge more for increasing advertisement on their websites. Since digitization
enables all kind of copyrighted works to be processed and uploaded onto the internet,
online users choose the network platforms that best fulfill their requirement. Making
copyrighted works available and free for access become a good business strategy to
OSPs even if the strategy may be illegal. For example, the court in Napster found the
platform committed the vicarious liability by reasoning that “it acted as a ‘draw’ for
consumers”. 147
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However, none of these profits can be reasonably deemed as illegal profits under
the framework of copyright damages. The subscription fees are legal revenues earned
by OSPs for offering specific services. As to profits earned by charging advertisement,
someone may argue it is indirect profits out of infringement. They cited Frank Music
Corp v. Metro-Golden-Mayer, Inc. 148 as an illustration. In Frank, the defendant used
several copyrighted songs of plaintiff in a show without authorization. 149 The court
held that the plaintiff could recover indirect profits as damages, because the show had
promotional value to the defendant’s commerce. 150 This argument erred because in
MGM the defendant used copyrighted works in the show for promotion and earned
profits, whereas OSPs infringe copyright for attraction of more viewers, not earn
profits through the unauthorized posting.
On the other hand, individual end-users are not the most suitable target for
copyright holders to impose this king of damages. Unlike OSPs which provide
services for users and gain commercial profits, individual end-users primarily pursue
for non-commercial enjoyment through the use of works. Even committing direct
infringements, they rarely generate profits from the infringing activities. They do not
charge others for downloading when they upload files, music, or video online. Under
the circumstances, copyright holders cannot expect high amount of damages by
pursuing non-commercial individual end-users.
2. Statutory damages
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Damages upon actual damages or/and profits prove to be problematic on one hand,
indicate the necessity and importance of statutory damages on the other hand. As Paul
Goldstein explains, statutory damages exist “because actual damages are so often
difficult to prove, only the promise of a statutory award will induce copyright owners
to invest in and enforce their copyrights and only the threat of a statutory award will
deter infringers by preventing their unjust enrichment.” 151 Usually, the majority of
online infringements end with the award of statutory damages, because the advantages
of such damages are obvious in online copyright disputes: the flexibility accelerates
judicial procedure; the statutory range leaves enough space for judgment to specific
cases; disregarding the proof on actual damages or/and profits alleviate the burden on
both parties; etc.

Despite these strengths, however, statutory damages gradually

present unexpected problems and weaknesses in practice.
a) Targeting the wrong party
Began in 2003, the RIAA initiated to file lawsuits against individual end-users
who illegally distributed copyrighted music through P2P file-sharing platform. 152
According to the RIAA, the legal campaign was to both raise public awareness of
illegality of unauthorized downloading and distribution, and force online users to
legally purchase music. 153 Eventually, the RIAA filed lawsuits against individual
end-users in the amount of approximately 35,000 during the five-year period. 154
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Regardless the ultimate goal, the legal campaign between wealthy plaintiffs and
poor, non-commercial defendants in the context of digital file-sharing proved to be
unfair. The groups of individual end-users, ranging from pre-teenagers to college
students till the elderly, are obviously less wealthy than RIAA and cannot easily
afford to litigate in federal courts. 155 As the result of unbalancing position, most of
the targeted defendants chose to cease “war” with the RIAA. Among the thousands of
lawsuits since 2003, only twelve have resulted in litigation. 156
Even if individual end-users are willing to fight with the wealthy RIAA, they
need to face unpredictable monetary penalty. Given the difficulty in proving actual
damages and profits, the RIAA tends to choose statutory damages as the best solution.
One recent well-known case, Thomas-Rasset 157 , indicated how unreasonable the
damages could be when RIAA targeted on individual end-users.
The Thomas-Rasset became the first P2P file-sharing case that reached a jury
verdict. Early in 2006, the plaintiff filed a complaint against Jammie Thomas, alleging
that she illegally downloaded and distributed twenty-four songs through a P2P
platform: Kazaa. 158 The jury found defendant willfully infringed all twenty-four
songs at issue, and awarded the plaintiff $9,250 per infringed song, which amounts to
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$220,000 in total. 159 Following the judgment, Thomas filed a motion for retrial based
upon the unconstitutionality of the excessive awarding. 160 She argued that the songs
were typically available online for one dollar each, and the plaintiff made the price of
seventy cents per song online. Hence, the actual damages to the plaintiff based on
twenty-four songs should be $16.80. 161In addition, the total damages were a thousand
times than actual damages even if the court awarded based on the minimum $750 per
infringed work. 162
Although the court did not grant a new motion, it addressed the issue that the
relevant jury instruction was a misstatement of law. 163 The court reasoned that “the
defendant is an individual consumer and a single mother. She is not a business. She
sought no profit from her acts…Thomas’s conduct was motivated by her desire to
obtain the copyrighted music for her own use…it would be farce to say that a single
mother’s acts of using Kazaa are equivalent, for example, to the acts of global
financial firms illegally infringing copyrights in order to profit…” 164
Moreover, the court calculated the amount of damages to Thomas compared with
actual damages claimed by her. The court assumed that the twenty-four infringed
songs were equivalent to approximate three music CDs, which were in the price of
$54. 165 The final awarding, by contrast, was $220,000. Such figure was “more than
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five hundred times to the costs of buying 24 separate CDs and more than four hundred
times to the costs of three CDs.” 166 After the calculation, the court concluded that
Thomas simply wanted to access free music as a non-commercial infringer, and her
actions should not be treated the same as commercial infringers, for their potential
gains distinguish enormously. 167
The Thomas-Rasset functions more like a warning to individual end-users. The
awarding of horrible statutory damages may still be possible in future litigation.
Despite most defendants eventually settled, litigation end with statutory damages is
still the major strategy for the RIAA to fight against individual end-users. Although
the RIAA claimed success of the strategy on increasing public awareness of illegality
of file-sharing and forcing users back to legal markets, some surveys indicated the
opposite results by such kind of litigation. 168 For example, a study indicated that the
number of people sharing music on P2P platform increased between 2006 and
2007. 169 The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) Digital
Music Report 2009 also found that “around 95 percent of music tracks are
downloaded without payment to the artist or the music company that produced
them.” 170 Furthermore, the lawsuits against individual end-users by the RIAA raised
general resistance from the public, especially among college students. 171 In summary,
166
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pursuing individual end-users by imposing statutory damages is not an effective
choice for online copyright enforcement.
b) Abnormal amount of awarding
Awarding statutory damages is under the discretion of courts within the statutory
range. Such framework enables flexibility and adjustability in copyright dispute and
eases the burden to courts on calculation. However, it also gives rise to unexpected,
results: unprincipled, inconsistent and arbitrary awarding.

172

Several online

infringement cases, including the aforementioned Thomas-Rasset, fully illustrate the
anomaly.
Our first example is the MP3.com 173, which can be deemed as predecessor of
Thomas-Rasset in the context of statutory damages. The trial court held that the
defendant had willfully infringed copyrights and awarded statutory damages of
$25,000 per infringed CD. 174 Given the fact that there were less than 47,000 CDs at
issue, the total amount was approximately $118,000,000. 175 This amount was
unreasonable based on the fact that no actual damages caused by infringement,
because MP3.com actually did not operate its service prior to trial and had not
charged fees to its subscribers. 176 Moreover, MP3.com merely streamed CDs that its
users originally purchased, which means copyright holders of sound recordings had
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already obtained some remuneration. 177 William Party commented the awarding in
MP3.com was “hardly necessary as a detergent for a defendant who had not made a
penny in profits off its use, and where plaintiff had conceded that it could not prove
any actual damages…” 178
Regardless of the correlation between statutory damages and actual damages, it
seems the amount of $25,000 is a modest figure because it still falls within the range
from $750 to $30,000. One recent case, however, has directly linked to the maximum
end. In Macklin v. Mueck, the defendant operated a poetry website and posted
plaintiff’s two poems online without authorization. 179 The plaintiff subsequently filed
lawsuit against the defendant and moved for award of maximum statutory damages
due to willful infringements after the defendants defaulted by not answering the
complaint. 180 The trial court ruled for the plaintiff and awarded $30,000 per infringed
poem. 181 Obviously, such awarding was plainly punitive and highly excessive
compared to the need of compensating copyright holders and deterring future
infringement, because the defendants was unlikely to recoup profits from the
infringement and the actual damages tends to be modest under the circumstances. 182
Similar disproportional awarding also imposed to the defendant in Los Angeles
Times, Inc. v. Free Republic. 183 The defendant, Free Republic, was a “bulletin board”
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website which enabled their members to comment the news articles posted on its
webpage. 184 The plaintiff, Los Angeles Times, contented the defendant facilitated
copyright infringement by routinely posting entire copyrighted news articles, and
charged for “archive fees” to members for accessing these works. 185 After addressing
fair use argument proposed by Free Republic, the court rejected and ruled $1 million
amount of statutory damages to the defendant. 186 However, the lawsuit was finally
settled between LOS Angeles Times and Free Republic. The amount of their
settlement was $10,000, which constitutes the ration of 1:100 to the statutory
damages. 187 Compared with the two figures, statutory damages sometimes can be
unreasonable.
Needless to say, excessive amount of awarding generates chilling effect on the
development of digital communication technology and online platform. Soon after the
trial finding of MP3.com, the total amount of statutory damages was $53.4 million. 188
Such awarding forced MP3.com into bankruptcy and its scribers could no longer
enjoy its online service. 189 Under the circumstances, statutory damages in MP3.com
in fact removed a multifunctional network platform from the internet and shut down
valuable online service, ignoring the need of non-infringing users and future
potentiality of that service. 190 After all, a new product or service needs time to
184
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evaluate the strengths and weaknesses when it enters into market in the early age.
More importantly, rarely a device is primarily designed for infringing use. However,
excessive statutory damages potentially eradicate innovation without considering its
ultimate benefits to society. 191 By awarding disproportional statutory damages, court
actually act as an arbitrator on the issue that whether an emerging technology should
be remained or removed, which is more suitable for policy makers to determine.
c) Doubtful statutory range
Statutory damages are known for its unique feature compared to other kinds of
damages: the statutory range. In theory, courts can award certain amount within the
range according to specific cases. Given that the frequent reference to the range in
copyright dispute, its importance can be seen from two perspectives. For one, it acts
as an indispensable guidance to judges in the calculation of awarding. For another, it
becomes a strong signal to all users with respect to their potential liability. However,
the statutory range does not present rationality when one looks deeply into the history.
The earliest origin of statutory range can date back to 1895, when advanced
printing technology made print physical copies more easily. 192 The newspaper
publishers sometimes unconsciously printed millions of infringed copies with
subsequent infringement charges against them. As the result, they pushed Congress to
set forth an upper end of statutory damages to ease their liability. 193 So, the 1895 Act
provided that the amounts from $100 to $5,000 to infringement of copyrighted
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photograph; and $250 to $10,000 to painting, drawing, engraving, printing, etc. 194
Although specially designed to certain types of works, it could still be treated as
prototype of the statutory range.
The formal statutory range appeared in 1909 Act, which provided that statutory
damages could be awarded no less than $250 and not more than $5,000 as the courts
consider just. 195 Such figures were the result of the conference during May 1905 till
Mar. 1906, which primarily dealt with the issue of drafting a new copyright law to be
presented for next Congress session. 196 In the second session from Nov 1-5 of 1905,
an attorney named Samuel Elder from Massachusetts specializing in copyright law
proposed his suggestion as to the upper end of statutory damages: “The suggestion I
made…purely tentative… is that we have some statutes…with regard to public
service corporations, stream railways, where there is a penalty to be enforced by an
action in court…finding the road, in case of death, a maximum being established, in
our state $5,000…” 197 It was unclear how persuasive his words to other delegates, yet
the groups of attendees almost unanimously voted to decide that the upper end of
statutory damages should be $5,000. 198 As to the lower end, The Photographers’
Copyright League argued that they at least need $250 to enter into litigation and paid
for the lawyers. 199 Obviously, such amount has no connection to compensation of
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copyright holders, but merely a basis for initiating a law suit.
The initial version of statutory range in 1976 Act remained the lower end of $250,
yet increased the upper to $10,000. 200 However, subsequent amendments enhanced
the amounts and did not bear much link to the actual market value of copyrighted
works. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 doubled the statutory
range to $500 and $20,000 respectively. 201 The primary goal under such enhancement
was to stimulate copyright owners to register their works, because copyright owners
need to register their copyrights to file lawsuits and claimed for statutory damages.
The possibility of recover doubling damages served as an incentive to copyright
owners. 202 The legislative did not show any sign that the enhancement accompanied
by the consideration of the actual damages, and such enhancement made statutory
damages depart from the primary purpose of damages: sufficient compensation and
effective deterrence.
Eleven years later, the Congress passed “The Digital Theft Act” which increased
the range to $750~$30,000. 203 This time, Congress justified the enhancement by a
different argument: “to provide an effective deterrent for copyright infringement
facilitated by advanced digital technology.” Instead of compensating copyright
holders, the enhancement was intended to make infringements more expensive to
infringers. 204 Despite the modified one took deterrence into consideration, it still
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disregarded the perspective of compensation to copyright holders.
Concluding from aforementioned, the statutory range did not relate to the market
value of copyrighted works and the compensation to copyright holders, but to other
considerations: initiating a lawsuit; serving an incentive to register; and deterring
infringements. Basically, effective copyright damages should not omit sufficient
compensation to copyright holders in order to preserve sufficient incentive for future
creation. Sufficient compensation requires the damages fully reflect actual damages
according to the fair market value of works. Such range, however, did not meet the
requirement. Given that the different nature between online websites and offline
markets, the range may weaken the effect of compensation to copyright holders. So,
statutory range generated from considerations without regard to compensating
requirement is unpersuasive and inefficient.
According to all the above mentioned, applying copyright damages to online
infringements presents problematic and ineffective results. It is often difficult for a
plaintiff to prove their actual damages on one hand, and unlikely to recoup
compensation from online infringer’s profits on the other hand. The statutory damages,
though flexible and costless to implement, tends to be “grossly excessive,
unprincipled, and arbitrary.” 205 The situation becomes even worse when certain
plaintiff, like the RIAA, targets on individual end-users with disproportional awarding.
By targeting wrong groups, the RIAA raises negative comments from the public and
potentially lost its supporters. Moreover, the statutory range did not take
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compensating requirement into consideration, which can eventually leads to
inefficient enforcement.
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Chapter IV Rethinking the Foundation of Copyright Remedy: Property rules &
Liability rules
Copyright is indispensable component of intellectual property. As distinctive
property exploited by right holders, copyright as well as other intellectual property
naturally relates to traditional perception of physical property. For one, copyright have
static value, which means right holders can exploit copyrighted works for profits after
creation. For another, copyright share dynamic feature as physical property because
lots of derivative works that seek for future benefits are based on original creation.
Under the circumstances, property rules traditionally possess dominant position in the
development of copyright law. Specially, copyright holders enjoy highly exclusive
rights to exclude others from exploiting the works. Once infringements occur, right
holders can enforce their rights to the extreme by requiring courts to impose
injunction over infringers. Such kind of remedy makes copyright holders enforce their
rights similar to land owners with regard to their lands.
Despite the dominance of property rules, exception still exists in copyright law.
Various kinds of compulsory licenses indicate the existence of liability rules. Unlike
property rules, liability rules act more like complements in copyright law. Generally,
they function better than property rules when personal transaction and enforcement in
copyright become expensive and inconvenient. Since liability rules negate voluntary
transaction to some extents and usually do not reflect accurate value, copyright
holders usually do not prefer to such rules. Copyright users, to the contrary, are
willing to support such rules which create more convenience to them. Basically,
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liability rules in copyright law mainly design to facilitate transaction due to market
failure, and offer ex post compensation. Copyright damages, in theory, are the best
examples for ex post compensation which function similar to compensatory damages
in contracts.
Remedies in copyright law are critically important to each right holder for
effective enforcement. Whether to impose injunction or award damages depends on
the option between property rules and liability rules. If copyright holders can easily
protect their works like land owners in real world, then injunction should be the better
choice because this kind of remedy exercises absolute exclusion and fulfills copyright
value greater than damages.
However, the situation significantly changes when it comes to online
environment. The evolving landscape indicates distinctive features between online
copyright infringement and offline tort of physical property. Unlike infringements of
physical property, online “taken” action is costless and time-saving. The progressive,
advanced digital technologies facilitate reproduction and distribution. One can
infringe copyright easily in his home, which is distinguished from steal of a car.
Moreover, high volume compression enhances the value potentially taken by
copyright infringers. Since injunctions are too absolute to clearly distinguish
infringements from non-infringing use and thus preclude all valuable online
exploitation when imposed, imposing injunction upon online infringement gradually
becomes less effective.

Under the circumstances, awarding damages gradually play

a more important role in online copyright remedy. Nevertheless, current copyright
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damages over online copyright infringements prove to be problematic and ineffective,
especially the statutory damages. Some awarding of statutory damages in case law
reflects certain degree of confusion on the nature of damages. 206 Should copyright
damages remain intact in online environment? A negative answer is highly possible.
This chapter analyzes property rules, liability rules and their connection to
copyright damages as well as the application to online infringements. The first section
briefly describes property rules, liability rules and remedies. This description serves
as a premise to the following analysis. In the second section, this chapter looks into
the interaction between property rules and copyright. The third section analyzes the
application of traditional property rules into online environment. In summary, the
analysis in this chapter acts as guidance to possible solutions upon current
problematic, ineffective online copyright damages.
A. Property rules, Liability rules and Remedy
Property rights are exclusive rights that the holder of certain property can control,
use, and recoup benefits from the exploitation. The right holder can exclude anyone
from exploiting the property without permission. 207 Such exclusion disregard
whether social benefits are enhanced by unauthorized use. 208 For example, an owner
has property rights to a house. A buyer who wishes to buy the house needs to
negotiate with the owner to get the entitlement, and the value of the house will be
increased after the transaction because the house is more worthy to the buyer. Just as
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Calabresi and Melamed mentioned: “…the entitlement protected by property rules
that someone wishes to remove the entitlement from the holder must buy from him in
a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the
seller…” 209 Since property right grant substantial power for owner to exclude others,
rarely can a third party intervene the owner’s exploitation. Property rights in fact
create the least extent of external intervention: The owner decides the value and
marketing of a given property. 210 Although each buyer is able to set forth how much
the property is worthy to him, the seller can simply reject if both parties do not reach
satisfactory agreement. 211
The liability rules, to the contrary, create rights that do not generate excludable
power on right holders, but granting them a chance to claim damages for certain
injury caused by tortfeasors. 212 For example, one injured in a car accident cannot
prevent a car from striking him down before the accident, but can claim damages
from the driver according to the extent of harm after the accident. Under the
circumstances, liability rules operate only when harmful actions occur, and the injured
do not have right to block certain actions. In other word, a person can remove certain
entitlement from the initial owner by simply paying an objective price determined by
a third party, like the court. 213 The price usually determined based on the hypothesis
that how much an initial holder would have sold it. The holder, by contrast, complains
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that he would have demanded for a higher price than the hypothetical one. 214
Distinguished from property rights which exclude most external intervention, liability
rules actually allow the third party intervention.
One regular issue of remedies is whether it is preferable to protect certain
entitlements by means of property rules or liability rules. In general, a property owner
prefers to injunction rather than damages because injunction under property rules
maximizes the value of a given property. An injunction can impose exclusive effect
over the tortfeasor, which cannot be achieved by damages. 215 Such exclusive effect
by injunction is highly important to the property owner. It forces all persons who
interests in a given property back to the private voluntary transaction, which is under
the control of property owner. 216 To the contrary, the damage-only remedy becomes a
weaker protection and equivalent to ex post forced licensing if the owner is denied
injunctions.
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Because the dynamic nature of property demands for future

investment and creation on existing property, lack of exclusive control would likely
weaken such incentives to a property owner. Thus, the owner may be less inclined to
produce and invest more on his property.
Damages remedy, on the other hand, aims at compensating losses after the
transferring of certain entitlement. Based on aforementioned, the taker of certain
property often value more than the owner, and is much likely to input more
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investment. From societal utility-maximizing perspective, such transferring creates
higher social welfare than remain the entitlement intact. A case in point is the creation
of derivative works in copyright. Basically, strong copyright protection by injunction
promotes innovation. However, excessively broad protection actually leads to
counterproductive effects upon copyright creation, because the public rely on original
works to create derivative works. According to Judge Pierre Leval, exclusive effects
by certain injunction in creative works would prevent references to prior works or the
building innovative ideas out of older one and “would strangle the creative
process.” 218
The choice between injunction (property rules) and damages (liability rules)
usually depends on given situation. Based on Calabresi and Melamed’s framework,
transaction costs play a determinative role on whether it is more effective to set the
price by private transaction or by a third party. 219 Transaction costs often determine
whether parties will reach an efficient outcome through bargaining over certain
property. 220 Generally, high transaction costs can be prohibitively expensive which
produce barriers for parties to eventually reach an agreement on market. Under the
circumstances, courts should depend on liability rules and award damages so as to
ensure an efficient outcome in the absence of consensual bargaining. 221 Low
transaction costs, on the other hand, make bargaining process simple and costless,
which enable parties to complete satisfactory transaction on market.
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Transaction costs usually contain two considerations: 1) the expenses and barriers
to negotiate with multiple parties and 2) strategic behaviors engaged by property
owners. 222 The first consideration can be easily understood: transaction costs would
be low when only two parties can readily arrange time and place for negotiation. The
more parties involved, the more negotiations need to conduct. Thus increase expenses
and barriers for sellers and buyers to reach satisfactory agreement. Basically, liability
rules would prevail over property rules when multiple parties engaged in transaction.
The second consideration, strategic behaviors, is more often used for arguments
on the advantages of liability rules. Once property owner is granted property-like
protection on certain entitlement, he can exercise this power to refuse any access in
order to artificially inflate the price. Thus, from the standpoint of transaction, both
parties lose the opportunity to enlarge the value of the entitlement. From the
perspective of social welfare, the failure of transaction deprives the public of
opportunities to enjoy more benefits. Under the circumstances, applying liability rules
can effectuate transaction and maximize social value.
B. Property & Copyright
1. Dominance of property in copyright
Law and economics communities have long been considering whether it is
preferable to protect copyright by means of property rules or liability rules. 223
Copyright is indispensable component of intellectual property and the term,

222

Mark A. Lemley &Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability rules Govern Information? 85TEX.

L. REV. 783, 786 (2007).
223

See Blair & Cotter, supra note 133, at 1613.

67

“intellectual property”, seems to denote that copyright closely connect to property
rules. 224 The vogue to define copyright, as one part of intellectual property, belongs
to another species of physical property gradually place property rules in dominant
position in copyright.
Transaction costs are one of the considerations which incline to property rules in
copyright. The dominance of property rules lies in the following advantages: (1) only
two parties involving in transaction that are easy to identify; (2) transaction costs are
low; and (3) each copyrighted work share distinguished feature and market in
different business environments. The pricing decision should be left to both parties in
transaction rather than the third party so as to avoid expensive, time-consuming and
often inaccurate process. 225 The representative of liability rules in copyright,
compulsory license that operated under some statutory rate, is less efficient than
property rules. 226 The compulsory license scheme is primarily designed to specific
situation when transaction costs are high so that efficient transfer of copyright
resource cannot be available. However, such scheme omits market value and may
become fallacious premise for copyright damages.
In addition to the consideration of transaction costs, some courts and
commentators tend to agree the idea that copyright holders should be entitled to
capture full social value out of their exploitation, fearing that free riding by copyright
infringements would weaken the incentive for future copyright creation. Their
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perception indicated the conclusion that the growth of property rhetoric in copyright is
not closely identified with general concept of common law property, but with the very
standpoint that property owner should internalize or recoup all social value of said
property. 227 Such conclusion originates from the essence of private ownership as
solution to “tragedy of commons”. 228 The “tragedy of commons” denotes the danger
of negative externality to property. For example, a non-private grass land would be
over grazed by herds because each shepherd does not care the sustainability of the
grass land, eventually make the grass land desolate. Hence, granting private property
right over certain entitlement is the solution to reduce negative externality.
Among a variety of negative externalities, free riding is the major problem
emphasized by scholars. Free riding refers to a person who obtains benefits from
someone else’s investment, which undermine the externality-reducing function and
goals of property system. 229 The danger lies in that property owner would not further
invest sufficient resources in his property if others can easily free ride on the
investment. In copyright, free riding usually occurs. Image individual end-users freely
download music made by record company without paying a dime; college students
upload latest movie in campus network for sharing without permission; P2P
file-sharing platform facilitate distribution of copyrighted works without authorization;
etc.
In an effort to eliminate free riding, copyright law had been gradually modified to
227
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impose more property-like protection over works. Terms of protection have been
extended; the scope of rights has been expanded; the number of copyrightable works
increases and it is easy to qualify for copyright protection; penalties become
harsher. 230 In addition to legislation, courts sometimes awards damages with
property-like

feature.

The

result

of

such

awarding,

nevertheless,

counterproductive impact upon copyright enforcement. The Thomas

causes
231

and

MP3.com 232 are exemplary cases which indicate the grossly excessive awarding of
statutory damages in online copyright infringement. Reprehensibility in both cases
cannot be said high because proof of willfulness was weak. Also, none of the
defendants were repeated infringers for which enhanced statutory damages were
targeted. The ratio of awarded statutory damages to actual damages was also
disproportional. 233
2. Liability rules: exceptions to copyright
In general, liability rules exist as statutory exceptions in copyright law. For
example, §115 provide compulsory licensing of musical compositions for use in
phonorecord. 234 § 118 provide compulsory licensing of works for use by public
broadcasting

entities.

235

§119

provide

compulsory

licensing

for

satellite

retransmission. 236 All these statutory exceptions usually targets on potential barrier in

230

Id. at 1044.

231

579 F. Supp. at 1210.

232

92 F. Supp. at 349.

233

See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 172 at 480.

234

17 U.S.C. § 115.

235

17 U.S.C. § 118.

236

17 U.S.C. §119.

70

private transaction which increase transaction costs. Under these exceptional
circumstances, the third-party price decision can reduce cost and remove barrier more
efficient than personal pricing decision.
Theoretically, copyright transaction usually involves a relatively small number of
parties, sometimes merely the buyer and the seller. Such situation reduces barriers and
expenses in negotiation and facilitates price decision, eventually leads to more
optimal outcomes through successful transaction. From comparative perspective,
property rules operate more efficient than liability rules under low transaction costs.
Liability rules, to the contrary, often promote efficiency when it is relatively easy to
determine the price of a given transaction by reference to an objective market
value. 237 Under the circumstances, courts can promote efficiency if accurately assess
the harm due to infringements imposed upon right holders and apply liability rules
that allow the infringing use so long as damages are equivalent to the actual harm.
Contracts cases provide high profile examples. Often courts can easily calculate
approximate damages as compensation to injured party based on the objective market
value. The underlying purpose is to encourage the efficiency of breach: such
compensatory damages both remedy the injured party and transfer the entitlement for
more valuable use, because the breaching generates a substitute transaction with
someone who values the entitlement more.
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nevertheless, the case is different. The actual damages by unauthorized use of
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copyrighted works often lead to inherent confusion. Un-copyrightable idea and
copyrightable expression usually merge together, and the line is not clear enough for
even judges to differentiate. The subjective merging situation denies the reference to
objective market, and courts have difficulty in calculating equivalent damages used
for promoting efficiency. So long as the injured party is not sufficiently compensated,
the anticipated value of transferring the entitlement is greatly reduced.
As to remedy issue, the preference for property rules by courts makes liability
rules less popular in litigation. Injunction, on behalf of property rules, often granted as
a matter of course upon proof of copyright infringements. 239 The benefit of granting
injunction is to force both parties in litigation back to private negotiation in order for
optimal outcomes. Damages-only remedy, as hallmark of liability rules, is equivalent
to third-party price decision. According to Professor Merges, damage remedy
functions as “ceiling on the amount the right holder can collect”. 240 Under the
circumstances, if courts set the ceiling lower than expected level, the economic
incentives of copyright holders will be undermined. The best way to avoid such
situation is “set the price equal to the holder’s valuation in separate case, which is of
course more efficiently accomplished by a property rules.” 241 Accordingly, the
holders of copyright protected by property rules often have more incentives than those
in liability rules to invest valuable creation. In summary, either to facilitate private
transaction or to stimulate the motivation of creation, liability rules are less preferable
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than property rules in copyright.
3. Rethinking property in copyright
Although the dominance of property rules in copyright has long been a tradition,
the application into remedy issue gives rise to problematic and ineffective results. The
assumption that copyright holders should be entitled to capture all social value out of
their works stimulates excessive awarding of damages. Actually, none of economics
literature denotes that producers can capture the full social value of their products, or
owners of certain property can internalize all positive externalities. 242 From free
market perspective, producers are entitled to earn sufficient return to cover their costs,
including reasonable profits. 243 So long as the price covers marginal costs the
producers would continue their production. Fully internalizing positive externalities,
on the other hand, will leads to a monopoly world. Monopoly increases returns to
producers and brings them closer to all social value, and eventually overwhelm
competition in free market. 244 Fearing the danger of monopoly, people design
antitrust law to make sure positive externalities are not fully captured by producers,
but left to increase social welfare. 245
Property law never directly recognizes the idea that owners are entitled to capture
all positive externalities. Imagine one cultivates scent flowers in his front yard, he
cannot charge from passengers-by by claiming they smell the good from his flowers.
Property law does not give him such right to expand the control of positive
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externalities. Even if the passengers-by seems to free ride the benefits out of scent
flowers, the idea to eliminate such kind of free riding is irrational. After all, positive
externalities exist everywhere and producers should not demand to fully internalize
them. If free riding means merely acquiring benefits from another’s investment, the
law should not prohibit such action so long as producers can earn sufficient returns
and reasonable profits that cover their marginal costs. 246 In summary, unless effective
exploit certain property demand high returns which is equivalent to the full positive
externalities, complete internalization must be denied.
The fear and enmity to free riding among property owners largely come from the
features of physical property. Firstly, rivalrous uses by multiple parties cause “tragedy
of commons” to a given property. Secondly, physical property is finite and can be
depleted eventually. The more exploitation, the faster it will be depleted. Copyright,
however, do not share the same features as physical property. Consumption of
intangible goods is nonrivalrous, which means the use of an idea does not impose any
costs on another user and one cannot easily exclude others. 247 The uses by everyone
on intangible assets do not preclude others from using the asset or lead to depletion.
Therefore, the “tragedy of commons” on physical property disappears when
intangible property is taken into consideration. Under the circumstances, the concern
and danger of free riding in copyright are substantially weakened.
Free riding on intangible goods occur ubiquitously. The use of certain expressions
in copyright does no harm to creators. To the contrary, such use is one of the goals
246

Id. at 1049.

247

Mark A. Lemley, What is Different about Intellectual Property? 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2005).

74

that copyright law intends to promote: copyright protection is essentially designed to
maximize societal welfare by promoting literary and artistic progress as well as enrich
the public. The only concern under copyright law is that a creator may risk the danger
of insufficient compensation to cover their costs, and deprive him of incentives for
creation. Since copyright creations always build on pre-exiting works, creators should
neither internalize the full value nor seek to monopolize his products in order to leave
enough positive externalities for future creation.
Another difference between copyright and physical property is the boundary of
rights. In general, both physical and legal boundaries of physical property are clear.
One can figure out the boundary of a house by looking at fences that surround it, and
the owner can fully understand what kind of rights he can exercise over his house by
referring to property law. Under the circumstances, transaction between potential
buyers and the house owner is effective because both parties know clearly what they
can obtain from the transaction. Protection of this house can also be easy and efficient
because all rights are listed under black-letter law. In summary, a clear boundary of
rights creates certainty to both private transaction and legal protection.
Considering copyright, however, the situation is significantly different. Intangible
creations do not have physical boundary that can be clearly defined. It is impossible to
locate “fences” to certain intangible goods like that in real property. A user may know
a particular work is copyrighted, but he may have no idea of what kind of use is legal
or not. He may comply with the reproduction right while violating public performance
right due to his misunderstanding. Moreover, the highly theoretical concept of fair use
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doctrine, idea/dichotomy and merger doctrine greatly blur the boundary of legal
protection. Most people cannot confidently tell the difference and figure out the
boundary except for judges and scholars. Under the circumstances, the boundary of
rights either makes enforcement of copyright insufficient to right holders, or overly
expands the protection which disproportionately internalizes positive externalities.
Based on the above analysis, copyright actually does not share so much analogy
and relevance to the physical property even though copyright traditionally fall within
the scope of property. The major concern in property, free riding, does not justify the
overly expanded protection of copyright. For one, free riding under copyright
promotes underlying goal of copyright law. For another, the improper introduction of
such idea into online copyright damages leads to problematic and ineffective results.
Moreover, the uncertain boundary of rights worsens copyright enforcement to a great
extent. Obviously, copyright damages should not operate under the misunderstanding
of property rules.
C. New landscape emerges: online environment
Digital technologies not only create new challenges to copyright law, but question
the application and reasonability of property rules for online copyright enforcement.
The landscape of creation and dissemination of copyrighted works has significantly
evolved due to revolutionary technological progress. 248 Duplicating an electronic
copy online saves time with the aid of personal computers. Such updating, compared
to photocopy machine, efficiently reduces marginal costs of mass production so that
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increases potential profits to copyright holders by lowering their costs. On the other
hand, a user with personal computer can easily upload a perfect and high quality copy
of works onto internet for sharing. Such practice means unauthorized distribution
online becomes easier than disseminating pirated copies in an offline flea-market
because of the efficiency, quality and low costs by digital technologies.
The underlying rationale of property-like remedy in copyright is to effectively
deter infringers so as to force them back to private transaction, eventually make the
price close to the fair market value. Under the circumstances, both copyright holders
and users should satisfy with the result on private negotiation, because they obtain
what they need and the negotiation engenders the least costs.
When it comes to online environment, the underlying goal remains the same. In
general, most copyright holders regard their works valuable personal property online
and seek to exclude other online users from accessing or exploiting their works
without authorization. In addition to explore online market and establish new business
models, they also resort to copyright law to enforce their digital copyright. All their
actions focus on eliminating any sort of free riding facilitated by advanced
technologies and internalizing all positive externalities, just as they do in offline
world. Such actions, however, depart from the basic concept of property rules and
cause problematic situations to online copyright enforcement.
These problematic situations are largely due to the misunderstanding of property
rules, and the results often give rise to counterproductive effects. To illustrate,
consider the issue of injunction imposed on online search engines. As is known to all,
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search engines depend on special software to categorize websites and download
specific web-pages for indexing. When a search engine is charged for engaging
copyright infringements by making given copies, it is difficult to enjoin it from
making given infringing copies while simultaneously allowing it to make
non-infringing ones. 249 Such requirement will leads to shutdown of that search
engine. Eventually, such property-like remedy negates legal users’ accessibility and
reduces efficiency by the search engine.
A case in point is Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc. 250 Perfect 10 owned copyrights on
pornographic photos and sued Google for copyright infringement because some of the
websites indexed by Google contained unauthorized copies of its photos, and Google
also displayed some low-resolution “thumbnail” photos which infringed Perfect 10’s
copyright. 251 The district court held that the website caching and linking to infringing
websites were not copyright infringement considering the basic nature of search
engine, 252 but concluded that the “thumbnail” photos in Google infringed copyright
because these copies might interfere with the sales of low-resolution photos for
downloading to cell phones. 253
The problem to Google was that it was nearly impossible to stop only the display
of infringed “thumbnails” photos without interfering other legal operation of search
engine. From the standpoint of Perfect 10, an injunction that prevented all photos by
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Perfect 10 in Google was more preferable and effective to make sure no infringement
occurred anymore. As a matter of fact, reliable methods that Google could comply
with such an injunction would either be to shut down the photos search image
altogether, which blocked enormous amount of non-infringing content for access; or
to check specific content for infringement by hand, which slowed down the process
significantly and increased expenses to Google. 254 Realizing the difficulty to Google,
the court imposed a preliminary injunction upon Google. 255 Instead of totally
enjoining Google, the court offered a highly flexible standard which was similar to the
DMCA “notice and takedown” provision. 256 In adopting such limited injunction, the
court departed from the absolute exclusion under property rules and accepted certain
degree of free riding online in order to maintain normal operation of the search
engine.
In addition to search engines, P2P file-sharing platforms offer a high profile
example. Generally, an injunction upon P2P platforms covers non-infringing materials
as well as infringing ones and forces those platforms to shut down. In the context of
Napster 257, such an injunction did not give rise to many losses to online users because
nearly 99% of uploading materials were infringing. 258 When it comes to Grokster,
however, the injunction made nearly 10-30% non-infringing materials unavailable
online. 259 Obviously, the enforcement by injunctions online often results in shutting
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down of P2P file-sharing platform and depriving online users of fair opportunities to
access to non-infringing materials. The decision by Supreme Court on Grokster
actually denoted inappropriate understanding of property rules in online environment.
Based on aforementioned, one can conclude that property-like remedy, injunction
or current copyright damages, function well when the scopes of property rights are
well defined. In the context of physical property, this does not add up to difficulty and
problems, because one can easily differentiate exact scope of certain physical property
and the impact of such remedy usually does not exceed the scope. However, copyright
are ill-defined, not only because one cannot accurately know whether a work is
protected but because the statutes sometimes are ambiguous so that one cannot figure
out whether certain aspect of a work is protected. 260 Moreover, it is difficult to judge
whether a particular use is infringing or not, and imposing such remedy will lead to
unreasonable intervention to normal use.
Internalizing all positive externalities online without distinguishing the nature
will exclude both infringing and non-infringing use of works, and deprives online
users of potential opportunities for fair use or transformative enhancement. Thus
narrows the public domain for future creation. Not all free riding online are
counterproductive. Unauthorized use of protected works, though sometimes infringed
copyright, often leads to the creation of more valuable derivative works. From the
perspective of social welfare, permitting certain degree of unauthorized use in
exchange of more broaden public domain is better than monopolizing intellectual
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product by individuals so long as the creators still have incentives to invest their
production. Obviously, such incentives do not demand all positive externalities as
compensation. Therefore, the idea of internalizing all positive externalities is no
longer appropriate to the enforcement of online copyright.
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Chapter V We should be on the right track: Suggestions and Solutions
Current copyright damages to online infringements prove to be problematic and
ineffective. As Chapter III indicates, damages upon actual damages or/and profits
cause difficulty for both parties to implement in litigation, and the calculation and
apportionment cause uncertainty and speculation. Statutory damages, on the other
hand, mainly designs to ease the difficulty for courts in judgment. However, frequent
use of such damages leads to unexpected results: excessive amount of awarding,
targeting wrong people, and unreasonable statutory range. The endeavor by copyright
holders to enforcement do not raise much public awareness of online copyright
protection among social groups, but trigger negative comments to their enforcement
strategies. Moreover, such strategies denote that copyright holders still seek for
eliminating all free riding and try to internalize all positive externalities. Under the
circumstances, the implementation of statutory damages seems gradually contain the
feature of property-like remedy even though such damages should normally operate
under liability rules in theory.
According to the analysis in last chapter, property rules are generally more likely
to promote efficiency then liability rules when implemented by copyright holders for
enforcement. It seems that imposing injunctions over infringements should be the
most approximate choice with regard to promoting effeciency. Such kind of remedy,
to the contrary, depart from the correct idea that property owner should not internalize
all positive externalities. When considering online environment, injunctive remedy
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become more problematic. 261 Compared with injunctions, damages can preclude such
problems because damages primarily focus on sufficient compensation to injured
copyright holders. So long as the compensation is sufficient to cover the losses,
copyright holders should not claim for additional benefits. Therefore, part of positive
externalities will be freely left to use and the public domain will be expanded.
Since copyright damages can potentially become more efficient then injunctions
to online infringements, developing an effective damages model is indispensable.
Sufficient compensation is not the only perspective that effective copyright damages
should take into consideration. In theory, copyright law aims at maximizing social
welfare by promoting cultural production, increasing valuable creation and enriching
public available resources. Therefore, an efficient model of copyright damages should
cover all the underlying considerations from social perspective as well as individual
perspective. For one, lack of sufficient compensation deter potential authors from
creating. So, the number of cultural production will be less than the optimal
requirement. 262 As a result, the public domain will be narrower and less works can be
used as “building blocks” for future creation. For another, overcompensation to
copyright holders is almost equivalent to allowing they monopolize all social value,
leading depletion of the public domain. The critical point of damages model lies in the
balance of interests between each online player.
This chapter explores the efficient model of copyright damages to online
copyright infringements, and uses such model as general principle to specific
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problems. The first section discusses the basic framework of efficient copyright
damages. This discussion serves as a premise to the following analysis. In the second
section, this chapter specifically discusses solutions to given problems analyzed in
former chapters. The solutions largely focus on statutory damages which cause major
problems and debate as well as looking into solution of damages upon actual damages
or/and illegal profits.
A. What is efficient copyright damages model?

How do effective copyright damages work? Basically, two perspectives need to
be considered: incentives and deterrence. Incentives primarily relate to the action and
choice of copyright holders. In theory, ideal incentives can trigger copyright holders
to create valuable works and invest more on future creation. As a result, the society is
able to benefit from the cultural progress. Insufficient incentives, equivalent to
ineffective copyright protection, usually force the number of works far from the
optimal requirement. Since other free riders will take advantages of efforts by creators
and publishers, copyright holders have to cease their cultural production because they
cannot recoup their investment from exploitation. However, insufficient incentives do
not follow that high level of incentives is the best choice. High level of incentives
often demands strong protection of copyright, which otherwise deter the creation of
derivative works that build upon preexisting works. 263
At the same time, deterrence chiefly targets on the actions and choices of free
riders: copyright infringers. Generally, effective deterrence can control the frequency
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and harm of infringements, and thus preserve benefits of creation to copyright holders.
Copyright holders usually treat these benefits as directive incentives, and their actions
will be affected by benefits. They will continue their creation If the benefits satisfy
them. Otherwise they would rather be free riders than keep on creating. From the
standpoint of infringers, their actions and choices depend on whether their profits
affected by deterrence. They often continue infringements if they perceive the
deterrence is slight compared to their available profits. To the contrary, infringers
generally are willing to stop infringements if deterrence adds up the costs to a point
that legal transaction can be more profitable.
1. Preserving the incentives
Copyright holders seek to maximize their benefits by creating valuable works.
Before they decide to formally invest the creation, they need to consider several
uncertainty issues that may affect the final outcomes: how much costs will be incurred
of the creation; whether such creation will be successful; how much the profits will be
if the work is successful; etc. The first consideration is the opportunity of success. In
theory, copyright holders are unlikely to invest an unsuccessful creation because they
cannot recoup benefits from such investment. In reality, almost every specific creation,
novel, movie or music, must depend on ex ante market survey in order to anticipate
potential costs/benefits and reach a success. Therefore, analysis that focuses on
expected profits upon success of creation is more reasonable, because the failure of
creation does not generate incentives to copyright holders.
After the analysis of initial stage, the second consideration is the costs of creation.
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Basically, the costs of writing a text book or other expressive works (i.e. drama; novel;
music composition, etc.) contains two categories. The first category is the costs of
producing actual copies. 264 The costs vary according to specific features of available
technologies. Considering reproducing a book: a printer machine increases the costs
with the increasing number of physical copies; an electronic copy, on the other hand,
saves more costs than a physical copy. In addition, distributing and restoring physical
copies also add costs of creation. 265
On the other hand, the costs of producing actual copies can be detected and
anticipated even though the differences exist in every technology. Imagine one
copyright holder writes a novel online and seeks to make profits through his creation.
He can negotiate with other online users; reach an agreement on the amount of
payment; and send an electronic copy of his novel to the user. Under the
circumstances, the cost of producing actual copies to the copyright holder is
significantly low. All he need is a personal computer and valid network connection,
and all the transaction can be finished between potential buyers and sellers. Thus
copyright holders can eliminate the need to negotiate with professional intermediary,
such as publishers, to facilitate reproduction and distribution. This eventually save
substantial amount of costs and in turn increase available benefits.
The second category is the costs to create a work. Unlike the costs of producing
actual copies, the costs to create closely relates to subjective elements. The costs
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primarily consist of author’s efforts and time plus publishers and editors’ efforts to
soliciting and editing. 266 Such costs may vary from person to person because each
creator has personalized method of creation and inequivalent capability in the process
of production. For example, writing a drama is much easier and less costless to a
professional writer than an amateur.
Despite the uncertainty, the costs to create still have certain theoretical grounds to
measure. The degree of copyright protection would affect the costs to create. Basically,
the less copyright protection is, the easier a derivative creator can borrow from
preexisting work. 267 Thus significantly reduce the costs to create a new work. On the
other hand, if copyright protection add up to a high level, then subsequent creator has
to either engage in costly search to look for resources in public domain or seek for
licensing by costly negotiation from copyright holders. Both actions increase the costs
to create. As a result, such costs reduce the incentives for creators to invest and lower
the optimal number of works. Therefore, copyright damages as ex post protection
should be adjusted to maintain sufficient incentives and optimal output of creation.
The costs of creation indirectly affect the incentives to copyright holders. Only
the expected profits can directly trigger copyright holders to continue their creation.
To calculate the expected profits, one needs to use actual profits minus costs of
creation. The final amounts are the available benefits to copyright holders. So, every
copyright holder strives to maximize the amount of expected profits by enhancing the
quality of works, promoting the sales, and reducing costs. The more profits there are,
266
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the more incentives will be, eventually leads to optimal number of production.
Such ideal situation, however, rarely exists because of the rampant free riding:
copyright infringements. Infringers do not incur the costs to create, and even the costs
of producing actual copies by infringers can be significantly less than creators. The
costs of creation to infringers are greatly lower than that of copyright holders. Under
the circumstances, infringers can drive the price close to or lower than marginal costs
to compete with copyright holders in market. Such situation no doubt distorts normal
copyright transaction, and reduces expected profits to copyright holders. To preserve
enough incentives, copyright damages should be devised to maintain the expected
profits to copyright holders unchanged. 268 One way is to sufficiently compensate
copyright holders so that they are not worse off as a result of infringements. So long
as the compensations cover costs of creation plus reasonable profits, copyright holders
will continue to invest on creation. 269 Another method is to deter infringements so
that infringers are not better off so that expected profits can be largely left unchanged.
2. Deterring infringement
From the standpoint of effective deterrence, the ideal copyright damages should
render infringers unprofitable. An infringer can be profitable either when he conducts
an infringement without being detected; or, the final damages imposed on the
infringer are much less than his profits. In reality, an infringer can either be detected
or not. The probability lies in whether a right holder is willing to invest in detection,
268
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which increases enforcement costs. Such action reduces expected profits of creators
because additional enforcement costs are incurred. To maximize expected profits,
creators should minimize or avoid all potential costs.
To invest in detection can be one option, yet not a reasonable one. A more
rationale option is to update copyright damages so that such remedy can make
infringers worse off. When an awarding of damages that is equivalent to profits by
infringement makes an infringer no better off, the infringer will be indifferent to the
choice between infringement or not. 270 When the damages exceed the profits, the
infringer will be deterred because he suffered mush losses than legally obtaining
license from a copyright holder. After all, most individuals take all possible outcomes
into consideration before they make decisions. People choose the object that provides
the greatest reward at the lowest cost. 271
How to calculate the amount of damages according to the probability of detection?
Basically, the damages should be multiple to the profits because the probability ranges
from zero to one (a hundred percent). 272 A general principle is that the optimal
multiple should be the reciprocal to the probability of detection. 273 Imagine that
regular damages to parking violators are $30, and the probability of being caught is
0.5 (50%). Since only half of violators can be caught and subsequently pay the
damages, the rest will still commit violation. To effectively deter the violation, the
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amount of damages should be $60.
The probability of detection, however, is more approximate than accurate. The
probability is the numbers of detected infringements divided by total number of
infringements. The problem lies in that undetected infringements affect the accurate
number of total infringements. 274 Moreover, even if one can accurately calculate the
probability, the measurement of profits is complicated. Only the profits attributed to
infringements can be treated as infringer’s profits for calculating the optimal damages.
Due to the inaccuracy and complication, optimal amount is difficult to calculate, yet
the baseline exists: a low probability of detection favors high amount of award.
B. The Solutions: Two perspectives for problems of copyright damages
1. Solutions targets upon statutory damages
a) Limit the excessive amount of statutory damages
The widely negative comments of current statutory damages should be the
“frequently unprincipled, arbitrary, and excessive amount of awarding.” 275 Such
awarding not only imposes unjust burden upon individual online users who merely
want to gain personal enjoyment, but on some OSPs that have persuasive fair use
arguments. Obviously, it needs to be limited.
To ease the problematic situation, judges should exercise their discretion over
statutory damages wisely and prudently to avoid excessive awarding. §504 (c) of
1976 Act clearly provides that “…as the court considers just…” 276, which indicates
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judges should award statutory damages within appropriate amount. Specifically,
judges should take precedents into consideration when judging online copyright
infringements. These precedents showed that some awarding of statutory damages
proved to be quite moderate, while others are equivalent to actual damages of
copyright holders. 277 Even when judges enhanced the awarding, the amount usually
tended to be two or three times of actual damages. 278
The rationale in the precedents can be meaningful instructions to statutory
damages. For example, when judges believed that defendants infringed copyright with
a fair use argument, they sometimes award the minimum statutory damages. In
Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Kirkwood, the defendant unauthorized transmitted
copyrighted radio through telephone line that made its customers view the
advertisement. 279 The court awarded minimum statutory damages upon defendant
because the fair use claim was plausible to court, and no actual damages existed to the
plaintiff. 280
Courts also award minimum statutory damages when infringements merely caused
little damages to copyright holders and generated minimal profits to infringers. 281 In
Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., the court awarded minimum statutory
damages against the defendant who unauthorized duplicated the plaintiff’s articles. 282
The court reasoned that $250 could sufficiently compensate the plaintiff and deterred
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the defendant because the article was written by a law school student published on the
school journal, and did not seek for commercial benefits. 283 Similarly, Doehrer v.
Caldwell provided a closely analogous rationale. The defendant reproduced the
plaintiff’s cartoon in his political campaign without permission. 284 The court rejected
maximum statutory argument by the plaintiff, because the infringement only caused
harm to plaintiff’s reputation without actual financial damages. 285 The court further
noted that “…rigid application of statutory damages leads to absurd results…its
deterrence should not be converted into a windfall where plaintiff only suffered
nominal damages…” 286
Although the above precedents mostly occurred in the pre-digital age, some
analogous features exist in online environment. First of all, online infringements by
OSPs always have certain degree basis of fair use. For example, commentators argued
that MP3.com should have a plausible fair use argument: It only streamed CDs
originally purchased by subscribers, so copyright holders already have recouped
financial benefits. 287 Moreover, MP3.com did not begin its service completely and no
evidence showed the plaintiff had suffered any actual harm due to the infringement. 288
As for OSPs, their profits do not bear direct connection to online infringements. Their
profits either come from fees charged from advertisement or subscription fees of
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certain services. None of the two can be attributable to infringement. 289 Apparently,
these facts should be squarely fit into the framework of awarding minimum statutory
damages.
Take individual users into consideration, the analysis should be the same. It is
doubtful to conclude that Thomas gained substantial financial benefits by simply
downloading twenty-four copyrighted songs in her home. Furthermore, Thomas action
was due to “her desire to obtain music for her own use”. 290 Obviously, individual
end-users like Thomas do not seek for commercial gains. Non-commercial online
infringers like Thomas hardly cause substantial damages to copyright holders. Their
actions primarily concentrate on enjoying online music for personal comforts. Though
they indeed commit direct copyright infringements, their culpability should not
deserve harsh penalty. Modest amount of statutory damages should be a reasonable
option.
Another analogous feature is that the impact on copyright holders by online
infringements. Currently no direct, convincing proofs indicate that online copyright
infringement account for the major portion of lost sales on content industry. The ratio
ranges from 0.7 percent to over fifty, varying according to specific circumstances. 291
Sometimes the actual damages to content industry are nominal, given that they have
different markets and can shift benefits from one to another so as to make up for the
losses.
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Efficient copyright damages should deter infringement by proper degree of
monetary punishment. Proper amount of damages can make infringers worsen off
because infringers cannot make any profits by infringements. Since most individual
users rarely obtain financial benefits through infringements, reasonable amount of
damages are enough to make them unprofitable and deter future infringement.
Accordingly, the disproportional amount of awarding in Thomas-Rasset was
extremely improper.
Someone may argue that the number of online users is astronomical and the
probability of being caught is trivial compared to the total amount. Although
individual users largely do not financially benefits from infringements, the probability
of detection demands excessive damages awarding to deter online infringement. Lack
of harsh financial penalty, online copyright free riding cannot be terminated. Such
argument is highly popular among copyright holders because they sometimes realize
the difficulty to trace all unauthorized use of their online works. The costs of detection
impose heavy burden on them and make it an impossible mission.
It is true that the probability of detection to individual users is relatively small, yet
not impossible. Remember the RIAA initiated to file lawsuits against individual
end-users who illegally distributed copyrighted music through P2P file sharing
platform in the beginning of 2003. 292 Approximately 35,000 users were sued during
the five-year period. 293 Technological advance made the RIAA capable of detecting
individual online users. Copyright holders now actually have the capability to detect
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infringement. The chance of being caught of online infringers substantially increases.
Under the circumstances, a relative high probability of detection favors modest
amount of award.
On the other hand, the important consideration lies in whether deterrence to online
infringement only depends on harsh monetary penalty. Among all the caught users,
only twelve went to litigation. 294 Most disputes result in settlement. The settlements
between the RIAA and online users usually amounted to thousands, which were much
less than the disproportional award in Thomas-Rasset. Obviously, the RIAA did not
rely on copyright damages for deterrence. Their purpose was to raise public awareness
of protecting online copyright and “educate fans about the law and the consequences
of breaking the law.” 295 Therefore, effective deterrence does not require high amount
of damages to online copyright infringement.
Modest amount of statutory damages can still preserve sufficient incentives to
copyright holders. As aforementioned, online creators can easily copy, store or
distribute electronic copies through the internet in costless way. Progressive digital
technologies greatly reduce the costs of producing actual copies. Meanwhile,
copyright holders nowadays can either individually manage their works online or
conduct transaction with the aid of collective society, like ASCAP or BMI. These new
business models also lower the costs of creation. Moreover, P2P file-sharing platform,
though sometimes illegal, indirectly increase the quantity of available resources and
expand the public domain. As a result, the costs to create are reduced and in turn
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stimulate the production of optimal output.
b) Targets on correct party
Online copyright infringements committed either by OSPs or individual online
users. So, copyright holders have to target either one or both. Current practices, filing
lawsuits against individual end-users by the RIAA, prove to be problematic and costly.
From the standpoint of effective enforcement, OSPs are more suitable than individual
users for copyright holders to target on.
OSPs conducted either direct or indirect infringement online. As for direct
infringement, OSPs naturally should be the targeting party due to their culpability.
When it comes to indirect infringement by OSPs, secondary liability, the situation
needs further examination.
Online service providers, as the intermediary on the internet, are not greatly
distinguished from their offline predecessors, given that they can both easily to
monitor and control copyright wrongdoing. 296 The intermediary, like flea market
owners, can supervise the market at low costs and exclude persons who commit
copyright infringement from his market. 297 Considering online environment, the
situation is highly similar. Despite American Online once had hard time to
differentiate

unlawful

transmission

of

copyrighted

music

from

legitimate

transmission, 298 recent advanced technologies enable OSPs to monitor users
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increasingly in cost-effective methods. 299 Since monitoring activities become more
inexpensive, OSPs can actually control infringing actions online. For example, OSPs
can suspend internet service to a given accused infringer or even terminate his
account on its website as penalty. Because social benefits partly lie in more sufficient
protection of online copyright, OSPs should bear the burden to exercise their duty in
order to facilitating enforcement. 300 So, targeting on OSPs with the menace of
penalty can better force them to perform their duty.
Even if digital technologies in the near future make OSPs difficult to monitor
copyright infringements, OSPs still are capable of making them under control. An
OSP can increase the rate for services and shift the costs back to users. Such strategy
though seems unfair to legal users, will smooth down the burden to OSPs. The
increasing benefits can be resources to afford high amount of damages on the one
hand and discourage illegal use on the other hand. Such discouragement would
eventually decrease the quantities of online infringement on a given OSP. After all,
infringers want to exploit online works at low or no cost. They become legal users if
they are willing to pay for the use, and are more sensitive to price increasing than
legal users. 301 In summary, targeting on OSPs is a reasonable option for copyright
holders to enforce their rights.
Pursuing intermediary rather than direct infringers had already been proved as a
cost-effective method before the emergence of OSPs. Early in the 1980s, many
299
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companies sold software tools that facilitated computer users to pirated copyrighted
games. 302 The copyright holders of the games could either sue these companies for
indirect infringements or users for direct infringements. 303 Due to expensive costs of
detection and litigation upon millions of culpable computer users, copyright holders
eventually choose to sue a handful companies due to the relatively low costs. 304
Based on above facts, copyright holders online should pursue OSPs rather than
targeting on millions individual infringers. A lawsuit against an OSP like Napster or
Grokster can give rise to positive benefits that not only protect copyright holders but
enhance public awareness of online protection, and meanwhile cut off the channel for
future distribution online by forcing these OSPs shut down or go bankruptcy. Suing
individual users, by contrast, do not generate the above benefits but merely rise
resistance and negative comments.
Some commentators argue that suing OSPs eventually leads to over-deterring
innovation and block future benefits brought by technology progress. 305 However,
technology communities did not show much concern like these commentators. Shortly
after the Ninth Circuit pointed out that Napster were liable for secondary liability in
online music piracy, new online services arose to substitute Napster. 306 Some of them
established their operations outside US territory in order to avoid any liability. 307
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Others updated their technologies so that no clear party would be liable for
infringements even if it was uncertain how effective the updating would be. 308
c) Clarifying the guidance
Most of the problematic situations we have discovered in statutory damages
actually arise from the merger of two policy requirements in a single framework
without clear guidance. As Paul Goldstein explains, “statutory damages are justified
because actual damages are so often difficult to prove, only the promise of a statutory
award will induce copyright owners to invest in and enforce their copyrights and only
the threat of a statutory award will deter infringers by preventing their unjust
enrichment.” 309 In other words, statutory damages operate to compensate copyright
holders when damages and profits are difficult to prove on one hand, and deter
egregious infringers by high level of awards on the other hand. In general,
compensation aims at preserving incentives to copyright holders, and deterrence focus
on reducing infringer’s profits. These two requirements, nevertheless, can be
separated. Preserving effective incentives does not demand high level of awards, so
long as the compensation is sufficient to cover the costs as well as reasonable profits.
On the other hand, modest level of award can still deter infringements when infringers
are not profitable. Therefore, a possible suggestion is to legislatively modify current
provisions of statutory damages by separating into two subsections. Each subsection
can be given more detailed guidance and focuses on specific purposes. 310
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As to enhanced damages, the related subsection can contain guidance that
describes specific egregious conditions that justify the high level of awards according
to relevant precedents. For example, willful and repeat infringes with constructive
knowledge of infringements should be imposed enhanced damages. 311 Such guidance
should be treated more like exception when courts award statutory damages, and
cautiously exercise so as to avoid unjust and inconsistent results.
Current maximum end is $150,000 per infringed work. The amount multiply the
accused quantity of infringed online works often leads to astronomical figures, which
is disproportional to actual damages of copyright holders. Therefore, the discretion of
courts upon awarding enhanced damages should be limited, especially in online
infringement. Another complementary modification is to change current maximum
end from $150,000 to two or three times of actual damages as in other intellectual
property damages. Basically, awarding two or three times of actual damages can both
sufficiently compensate copyright holders and punish egregious infringers. However,
such modification depends on reliable calculation of actual damages of copyright
holders, which is sometimes difficult.
On the other hand, conditions regarding innocent infringements should better be
modified so that courts can have flexible discretion to lower the minimum awards
accordingly. A defendant becomes an innocent infringer only when he proves that “his
infringing conduct was made in a good faith belief of his innocence, and he was
reasonable in holding that good faith belief.” 312 Such requirement essentially is
311
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difficult for individual infringers to prove given that most of them have the intent to
free ride online works. However, the point lies in whether individual users cause great
harm and make many profits by online infringement. The fact, as discussed above,
indicates the opposite conclusion. Individual users rarely financially benefits from
unauthorized actions and cause much harm to copyright holders. As in P2P
file-sharing cases, even the statutory minimum $750 per infringed work is still
disproportional to individual users and impose unduly burden on them.
Lack of guidance also means prospective online users of copyrighted works have
little basis to predict whether they would pay enhanced amount of damages or
minimum amount if their actions are found infringement. 313 Such unpredictability, in
turn, leads to chilling effect upon potential users who need to build on available
resources for creation under the menace of harsh damages even if they have
persuasive fair use basis.
2. Solutions to damages on actual damages/profit
Effective copyright damages should sufficiently compensate copyright holders in
order to preserve incentives for creation. In theory, the amount of damages should be
above the actual damages in order to achieve that purpose. However, exact
measurement of actual damages can rarely be accurate in copyright dispute, and the
situation exacerbates in online environment. As a result, most copyright holders prefer
to statutory damages as monetary remedy to enforce their rights. Such preference, in
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turn, causes frequent use of statutory damages as well as relevant problems.
In addition to the solutions that focus on current statutory damages, an alternative
to ease the situation is finding reliable criteria for damages calculation. A high profile
example exists in US patent law: reasonable royalty as damages. §284 of US Patent
Act provides that the court may award “damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer…” 314 The provision expressively indicates the primary
purpose of reasonable royalty is to compensate patentees and function as the bottom
line of patent damages which offers the least amount to patentees, given that the
licensing royalty approximate the fair market value to the use certain invention.315
The US Supreme Court defined reasonable royalty in patent damages as “the
difference between the patentee’s condition and after infringement, and what his
condition would have been if infringement had not occurred.” 316 When a patent
infringement does not distort sales of a patentee, the patentee can still claim for the
royalty fees that he could have reasonably charged from the infringer for a license to
use the patent at issue. Under the circumstances, patentees can always recoup
compensation to cover their costs.
In theory, the calculation method focuses on a hypothetical private transaction
between the plaintiff and the defendant. It does not matter whether there is an actual
transaction between the two parties. The strength of the methods is self-evident: it
314
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makes the calculation of actual damages easier and more plausible, because the
licensing fee is pre-determined by the seller. The amount of royalty based on fair
market transaction and best reflect the value of works. So, using reasonable royalty as
damages can better compensate copyright holders than awarding inaccurate statutory
damages.
Considering the application in patent law, reasonable royalty can be proper
standard for calculation actual damages. The purpose of reasonable royalty is to make
right holders not worse off as the result of infringements. As discussed in Chapter IV,
copyright holders are willing to continue to create works so long as the costs of
creation are covered. As rational persons in market, copyright holders must set the
price of work above the costs of creation in order for profits. Under the circumstances,
reasonable royalty as damages can make copyright holders profitable. On the other
hand, reasonable royalty is determined by copyright holders based on all market
elements, and originated from private transaction between copyright holders and users.
Hence the price comes closely to real value of works. By introducing reasonable
royalty into damages, copyright holders would not be worse off due to infringements.
Therefore, reasonable royalty as damages preserve the incentives for creation.
Awarding damages on reasonable royalty decreases costs in copyright litigation.
Judges can save time by simply refer to the reasonable royalty, rather than ordinary
time-consuming calculation of actual damages. Moreover, by narrowing possible
references to damages, the final awarding will be more predictable to both plaintiffs
and defendants. Based on predictable results both parties may settle their copyright
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dispute rather than litigation. This also increases the efficiency of litigation.
Someone may questions the deterrent effect on infringers by reasonable royalty as
damages. Because of its predictability, an infringer may not be deterred when he can
earn profits after paying the damages. Under the circumstances, infringements still
occur. Moreover, copyright holders who filed the claim burden litigation costs. Even
though reasonable royalty can cover the costs of creation, the litigation costs still
impose heavy burden on them. According to a survey conducted by American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) in 2003, the median costs of copyright
litigation were $298,000 upon discovery stage and $499,000 upon trial and appeal
stage. 317 Under the circumstances, they may be less likely to pursue infringement due
to such burden. Their unwillingness, in turn, eventually stimulates online copyright
infringement. To ease the concerns, a relative proper solution is to give courts
discretion to enhance the amount of damages two or three times to actual damages in
order for deterrence.
Another controversial issue is how to determine the appropriate royalty to online
copyrighted works. Setting the reasonable royalty by governmental bodies can be one
of the options, just like compulsory license in copyright law. However, such rates are
debatable and usually outdated, because the governmental bodies do not participate in
private market transaction thoroughly and the rates cannot reflect the supply and
demand curve in online environment. Moreover, reasonable royalty functions when
infringed works circulate in market under a uniform licensing framework. For most
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individual creators, however, a uniform online licensing framework is difficult to
negotiate. Each creator can claim a specific price based on his own perception on his
works. Lack of such standard, courts would be trapped in complicated proof
procedure.
To be reasonable and reliable, the standard can rely on existing online business
models given that each kind of online work targets on different users groups and
reflect the market demands. The success of online business models can best reflect
true value of works on the internet. For example, In addition to selling hardware,
Apple Company offers online business service: the iTunes. The iTunes online store
provides downloading, managing and buying games, music and media. 318 The
mechanism is “pay per-use”, that is, users pay for the works they access. Different
works have respective price on its online store: songs are charged for $1.29 per-use,
TY shows for $1.99 or $2.29, and movies for $14.99. 319 The prices are acceptable by
most online users and create huge financial benefits to the Apple. The company
generates revenue at the rate of $100 million a year with 10 percent growth
annually. 320 Therefore, when awarding damages based on reasonable royalty, courts
can take such price into consideration.
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Chapter VI Conclusion
Current copyright damages, inter alia, are primarily designed for copyright
infringements in the pre-digital age. With the emergence of digital technologies,
online copyright infringements function in a way quite different from offline
infringements and impose great difficulty to right holders for enforcement. Ease of
reproduction, widespread distribution, and high volumes compression significantly
challenge traditional perceptions of copyright. These revolutionary progresses change
the production and distribution of our culture. In response to such challenge, the
standard of liability had been updated in order to fit online infringement into legal
regulation.
On the other hand, copyright damages as final remedy still remain intact. Recent
online cases have showed problematic and unjust results because of the
implementation of copyright damages, regardless the very nature of digital
technologies. Specific problems are as follows: difficulty in proving actual damages;
no plausible profits can be found; targeting on individual end-users who are less
culpable; excessive, inconsistent awarding of statutory damages compared to actual
damages of plaintiffs; and questionable statutory range under statutory damages.
These problems not only depart from the original purpose of copyright remedy, but
cause negative comments and resistance from the public.
The problematic results are largely due to the misunderstanding of property rules
in copyright damages. Property rules traditionally are dominant in copyright because
remedy under property rules can force infringers back to transaction, which eventually
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adds up efficiency. Nevertheless, the idea of internalizing all positive externalities of
works is deeply rooted in almost every copyright holder. From offline physical world
to online electronic realm, such idea does no change. Based on such idea, copyright
holders always wish to recoup all externalities by ex post damages when
infringements occur. Copyright damages, as a remedy under liability rules in theory,
gradually contain effects of property rules when awarded in practice. In fact, property
rules do not require the owner internalize all positive externalities. Therefore,
copyright damages should functions under the idea of optimal remedy: sufficient
compensation to copyright holders so as to preserve incentives for further creation;
make infringers worse off and effectively deter them. So long as the above purposes
can be achieved, no more awards need to be granted.
It is time to reassess current copyright damages to online infringements: Limit the
excessive awarding of statutory damages, and cautiously determine the amount
according to actual damages and deterrent effect; target on large online entity rather
than individual end-users in order to enforce right just and effectively; and clarify the
guidance of statutory damages both to the willful and the innocent infringements in
order to add predictability to statutory damages. On the other hand, difficulty in
calculation of actual damages online still exists. To ease the problem, introducing
reasonable royalty as measurement standard can be one plausible option. Although the
deterrent effect may be weaken under such damages, courts can save time in
calculation and make the final awarding more predictable to parties involved in
dispute. In summary, Current copyright damages should be modified in order to better
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adapt to advanced technologies in online environment.
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